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Abstract
Web service security, as a branch of network security, is becoming more important 
as more business and social activities are moved on-line to the web. Existing network 
intrusion detection systems cannot be directly applied on web intrusion detection, 
because these systems are sitting on lower level of network model while web services 
are running on the higher level.
This thesis proposes a web intrusion detection system, SensorWeblDS, which 
combines the power of data mining for anomaly detection and signature matching for 
misuse detection. Data mining is the process of extracting implicit, previously 
unknown and potentially useful information from large amounts of data. Data mining is 
used in the proposed system to mine frequent parameter presence and orders. To 
combat buffer-over-flow attack, SensorWeblDS proposes a new algorithm using the 
standard deviation theory to calculate the possible maximum value length within a 
three-dimensional input. It also uses network sensor to monitor real-time network 
traffic in order to receive all parameters in HTTP request and improve both quality of 
detection and detection response time. Being different from existing web intrusion 
systems, which get HTTP requests only from web log files that contain parts of user 
inputs, our system collects data from both real-time network data and web log files to 
ensure all user supplied data are being monitored. Based on previous information on 
well-known web intrusions, our system abstracts some common signatures and 
sensitive keyword signatures to match these known attacks. In HTTP request 
processing, existing web intrusion detection systems audit each record separately, while 
our SensorWeblDS system considers the relationships amongst records in a time 
window. This is based on the observation that it is always suspicious if the same 
requests cause lots of error in a short period of time. The thesis also analysis some other 
intrusion detection systems and compare them with our system.
Keywords:
Web intrusion detection, Network intrusion detection, Data Mining, Association rules, 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), standard deviation, Sensor based
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1. Introduction
Security of network systems is becoming increasingly important as more sensitive 
information is being stored and manipulated online, with even more attacks are being 
launched every second. The security of a computer system is compromised when an 
intrusion occurs.
Consider the example of sapphire worm [AOT+03]: it was the fastest spreading 
computer worm in history. This worm virus spread through the Internet in 2003. The 
number of infected computer systems doubled in size every 8.5 seconds. In 10 minutes 
after release, it infected more than 90 percent of vulnerable hosts.
Therefore intrusion detection system (IDS) becomes increasingly important. There 
are two kinds of traditional IDSs [BK03]: (1) misuse IDS, which uses patterns of 
well-known attacks or weak spots of the system to identify intrusions (e.g., famous 
Norton Antivirus software is a kind of misuse IDS); and (2) anomaly IDS, which tries 
to formulate the normal usage patterns and determines whether deviations from these 
normal patterns are intrusions, (e.g., common firewall products belong to this kind of 
anomaly IDS). However, these two kinds of traditional IDSs demand too much human 
involvement. Security experts have to analyze every known intrusion using their 
domain knowledge, and hand-code signatures (patterns) for those intrusions, and this 
process is very time consuming and expensive. Also these IDSs need frequent updates 
using new signatures when new intrusions emerge. The speed of these updates is much 
slower than the rate the new intrusions spread. Thus, many vulnerable computer 
systems with these IDSs installed will still be compromised before the IDSs get 
updated.
To conquer these shortages, researchers have proposed many new technologies. 
Amongst them, data mining is a very important one ([LSM98-1], [LSM98-2], 
[LSM99-1], [LSM99-2]) and ADAM ([BCJ+01-1], [BCJ+01-2]). From the 
data-centric point of view, intrusion detection can be considered as a data analysis
- 1 -
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process. Anomaly detection involves finding the normal usage patterns from the audit 
data, whereas misuse detection is for finding the patterns of intrusion, and then using 
these patterns to inspect audit data [SLM98-1]. More specifically, association rules and 
frequent episodes from audit data can be used to guide audit data gathering and feature 
selection, which are critical steps in building effective classification models. 
Classification models can be built and the model is used to identify new data as an 
anomaly or normal. Cluster analysis can be used for unsupervised learning on 
unlabelled data that contain both normal and intrusion instances.
Web application is a kind of network service. The web applications and the web 
services built upon them are becoming more important in today's Internet services. This 
makes the web application security an important problem. From the network’s 
perspective, a web service is using TCP communications just like any other network 
applications. Besides traditional network attacks like DoS, Buffer Overflow attacks, 
some new security problems are found for web applications, e.g. Cross Site Scripting 
attack ([CerOO], [Cgi02]), SQL-Injection ([SK02], [Spe05]), session hijacking 
([Imp06]), and cookie poison attacks ([Wik02], we shall list some examples found in 
some well-known websites). Previous research (STAT [IKP95], MADAM ID 
[LSM98-1], [LSM98-2], [LSM99-1], [LSM99-2], ADAM[BCJ+01-1], [BCJ+01-2]) 
on computer network security can not be used directly to detect such attacks, because 
these web attacks have no evidence on the underlying network layers where those 
existing IDSs are working. In other words, these attacks look like normal traffic to these 
systems. A few researchers ([ADDOO], [KV03], WWWstat [Fie96], Autobuse [Tay98], 
Logscanner [CR98], Swatch [ET93], and CyberCop [NA98], mod_security 
[I03-l][I03-2]) have done some work devoted to web application security. However, 
they also have some limitations. For example, they audit each web log record 
independent of other records without considering the relationships amongst these 
records, which could show strong evidence of attacks. They also do not consider some 
important features of HTTP specification and web applications.
This thesis work proposes an innovative web intrusion detection system, 
SensorWeblDS that combines the power of anomaly detection and misuse detection. In
- 2 -
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anomaly detection, data mining technology is used to discover the normal patterns in 
user supplied data and large deviations from these patterns are treated as anomalies. In 
misuse detection, it summarizes some common features of web attacks into several 
intrusion signatures, and uses these signatures to find suspicious data. SensorWeblDS 
develops a network sensor to monitor real-time network traffic in order to receive all 
parameters in HTTP request and improve both the quality of detection, and detection 
response time. Being different from most existing web intrusion systems, which get 
HTTP requests only from web log files that contain parts of user inputs, our system 
collects data from both real-time network data (by using network sensor) and web log 
files to ensure all user data are under monitoring. In HTTP request processing, existing 
web IDSs audit each record separately, while our system considers the relationships 
amongst records in a time window. This is based on the fact that it is always suspicious 
of the same user behind the requests who causes many errors in a short period of time.
1.1. Thesis Contribution
•  Proposes a web intrusion detection system, SensorWeblDS that combines the 
power of data mining and signature matching.
•  To combat buffer-over-flow attack, SensorWeblDS defines a new algorithm using 
the standard deviation theory to calculate the value length variety within the 
three-dimensional input.
•  Uses network sensor to monitor real-time network traffic in order to receive all 
parameters in HTTP request and improve both quality of detection and detection 
response time. While existing systems are analyzing off-line log data and 
discovering intrusions that previous occurred.
•  Our system collects data from both real-time network data (by using network 
sensor) and web log files to ensure all user data are being monitored. This is 
different from existing web intrusion systems, which get HTTP requests only from 
web log files that contain parts of user inputs.
•  Based on previous information on well-known web intrusions, our system
- 3 -
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abstracts some common signatures and sensitive keyword signatures to match 
known attacks.
•  It considers the relationships amongst HTTP access records in a given time window. 
Existing web intrusion detection systems audit each record separately, which will 
miss some important information hidden in the access sequence.
1.2. Outline of Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows: the rest of chapter 1 introduces network 
intrusion and web service intrusion concepts and some exploit techniques. Chapter 2 
examines some existing network intrusion detection systems and web intrusion 
detection systems, and the technologies they are using and limitations they have. Data 
mining concepts, association rules mining and common algorithms are also introduced. 
Chapter 3 explains the technologies and algorithms used in our SensorWeblDS. 
Chapter 4 presents the experimental results of our prototype system. Chapter 5 presents 
conclusions and future works.
1.3. Network Intrusion detection
1.3.1. Definition
An intrusion can be defined ([HLMS90]) as “any set of actions that attempt to 
compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability of a resource”. So, network 
intrusion is any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality 
or availability of a resource through network. All the behaviours of network intrusion 
are launched through the network. It does NOT include local intrusions like file-system 
virus, local brute force password testing, etc.
1.3.2. Intrusion classification
Basically, there are four kinds of intrusions [BK03]:
- 4 -
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•  User to Root Attack (U2R)
•  Remote to User Attack (R2U)
•  Denial of Service Attack (DoS)
•  Probes Attack (Probes)
The urgent degrees of these four kinds are: U2R > R2U > DoS > Probes. That is, 
U2R attacks have the most security concern. Unfortunately, current IDSs using data 
mining technologies are useful on capturing DoS and Probes attacks, but perform very 
poorly on detecting U2R and R2U attacks.
1.3.3. User to Root Attack
In this scenario, the attackers have normal user accounts on victim hosts. They 
exploit some software vulnerabilities to gain root accesses on those victim hosts, and do 
what they want after that. In most cases, the system vulnerabilities are caused by 
careless coding habits in buffer manipulation that usually lack boundary protection. 
The attackers then send buffers that are longer than the maximum buffer length, and 
hiding some malicious executable code in the extra spaces. This process is illustrated in 
Figure 1 below. Examples of U2R attack are Eject and Fbconfig.
Sto»y( (test buffer, source buffer);
Destination buffer that system accepts
Source Buffer ; Source buffer that attackers use
This space is used by attackers to put malicious code 
to gain root access
Figure 1 How can buffer overflow be used in attacks
-5 -
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1.3.4. Remote to User Attack
In this kind of attack, attackers usually do not have accounts on victim hosts. They 
send network packets to victim hosts and exploit some software vulnerabilities to gain 
normal user access. After that, they may use U2R attacks to gain root access and cause 
more severe damages. Examples are Dictionary and Ftp-write attacks.
The Dictionary attack uses the fact that many users do not choose a secure 
password carefully. So, the attackers use some hack tools to generate some common 
passwords and use them to guess the real password. This kind of attacks can be detected 
by monitoring the failed login attempts in a period of time.
1.3.5. Denial of Service Attack
DoS attacks can be performed on most modem software and operating systems. 
The attackers use tools to generate mass normal request for a service (e.g., HTTP), and 
overwhelm the capacity of the service providers, make them too busy or too full to 
handle legitimate requests. Examples are SYN flood and Ping of Death attacks. In Ping 
of Death attack, the attackers send huge amounts of ping requests to victim hosts, which 
make the victim hosts exhaust computing and network resources. The Ping of Death 
attack can be discovered by examining the size of all ping packets and flagging those 
that are longer than 64000 bytes as anomalies.
1.3.6. Probes Attack
A hacker launches a probes attack by using hack tools to scan all reachable network 
computers, and gather information, find known vulnerabilities. After that, the attacker 
can exploit these vulnerabilities to cause more damages. Example hack tools are 
Ipsweep and Mscan tools.
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1.4. Web Service Intrusion
Web-based intrusion is a kind (branch) of network intrusion that belongs to the 
scope of computer network intrusion detection. But it has some new features that make 
it unique. Besides traditional attacks like DoS, Buffer Overflow attacks, some new 
security problems are found for web applications, e.g., Cross Site Scripting attack 
([Cgi02], [CeiOO]), SQL-Injection ([SK02], [Spe05]), session hijacking ([Imp06]), and 
cookie poison attack ([Wik02]). Previous research (STAT [IKP95], MAD AMID 
[LSM98-1], [LSM98-2], [LSM99-1], [LSM99-2], ADAM [BCJ+01-1], [BCJ+01-2]) 
on computer network security cannot be used to detect such attacks, because these 
attacks have no evidence on the underlying network layers where those methods are 
working on. In other words, these attacks look like normal traffic to these detectors.
1.4.1. Definition
Web-based attack is a kind of network attack that is targeting web service and is 
carried in HTTP protocol. The target is the web server (e.g., IIS, Apache), or web 
application hosted on the web server (e.g., executable files or scripts like CGI and 
ISAPI), or the normal user that use the web services. The result of web-based attack 
could be: make Web service unavailable, allow attacker control target system, view or 
execute any file, steal confidential information on the web server, and hijack normal 
user session which could lead to stealing that user’s information on the server and 
performing more malicious attack covered by that user’s ID.
1.4.2. HTTP protocol and web logs
HTTP ([FIG+99]) is a client-server based protocol used between web browser and 
web server. To get the resources from web server, the client sends HTTP request to 
server through GET and POST commands. Every resource in the web server has a 
unique resource identifier -  URI. The resource could be a picture, e.g., 
“http://myweb/l.gif”, or a file, e.g., “http://myweb/f.html”, or a path which will be
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translated by the web server to a default resource, e.g., “http://myweb” will be 
translated to “http://myweb/default.html”.
A web page can accept user supplied data as input. E.g., “http://myweb/login.asp” 
can accept two parameters -  “username” and “password”. Once the user fills in these 
two fields in the web browser and clicks “submit” button, these two parameters and 
their values are included in a HTTP packet and sent to the web server. Based on the 
HTTP RFC2612 ([FIG+99]), there are three places in a HTTP packet that can carry the 
parameter and value -  URI, cookie and user data section. Here are three example HTTP 
packets carrying same parameters -  “username” and “password” for URI “/login.asp”:
1) Parameters stay in URI
GET /login.asp?memame=neo&password=lll HTTP/1. lV\n 
Content-Length: 25\r\n 
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.Ch\n 
W i
2) Parameters stay in cookie
GETAogin.asp HTTP/1 ,l\t\n
Content-Length: 25\An
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.Cfo\n
Cookie: usemame=neo&password=lllVw
\An
3) Parameters stay in user data section
POST Aogin.asp HTTP/1.l\t\n 
Content-Length: 25\t\n 
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0\r\n 
W i
username=neo&password=lll
Upon receiving a HTTP request, the web server processes it and responds with a 
return code indicating the result. Based on HTTP RFC2612 ([FIG+99]), all return codes 
can be divided into three categories: normal, error and information. The error return 
code indicates that the web server has encountered an error in processing this process. 
For example, code 404 means the client is accessing a non-existent URI, and code 403 
means the client is requesting a forbidden resource like password file.
Both HTTP request and response are recorded into the web server’s log file. A 
sample line in a typical log file looks like:
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67.2.3.4  -  -  [  10/0ct/2000:13:55:36 -0700] "GET/exampleCGI.php?id=20 HTTP/1.0" 
2002326
It means “client 67.2.3.4, at time [10/0ct/2000:13:55:36 -0700], used GET method 
requesting the resource “/exampleCGLphp” with parameter “id=20”, web server 
returned code 200 (normal), the total request packet was 2326 in length”. It needs to be 
emphasized that in the log file, web server only writes down parameters carried in URI. 
The parameters in cookie and user data section are totally ignored by the log file. The 
reasons for this are: performance -  the data in cookie and user data section could be too 
large to be written into the web log without affecting the web server’s performance; 
security -  some parameters contain sensitive values like passwords, they cannot be 
written into log file which could be leaked out to unauthorized person. To see all the 
parameters, a program can use network sensor to capture the real-time network packets 
and extracting all the HTTP parameters from the HTTP request, as our SensorWeblDS 
did.
1.4.3. Web-based attacks analysis
Like most network protocols, HTTP protocol is based on resource request / 
response model. The web service user constructs a request for a resource and sends it to 
the remote web server, and then the web server replies with the resource that the client 
wants. In the beginning of WWW/WEB period, all web resources are ‘static’ and look 
the same to different users. As the Internet grows, web services today are more complex 
than ever. They can provide a lot of dynamic content that make the user’s experience 
more enjoyable. For example, depending on user settings and inputs, different users can 
have different styles and contents on the same URL. This greatly promotes the 
spreading of web services and nearly any application can be done through the web now. 
The dynamic web service technology can be divided into three categories. The first is 
using server-side HTML embedded scripting languages, like Active Server Pages 
(ASP), Java Server Pages (JSP), and PHP. The second is using server-side add-on 
component, e.g., Common Object Model (COM), and Java Servlet. The third is using
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server-side executable files or script, and redirecting user input to the executable files 
and outputting of the files to the users. Dynamic web service can also be divided into 
two categories based on the input. One is accepting user inputs and doing some process, 
the other one is not accepting user inputs. Generally, most dynamic web services are 
accepting user input.
The user input is the hot point in security area, since most web-based attacks are 
launched through the user inputs. It is the windows to reach the heart of web services.
1.4.4. Cross Cite Scripting (XSS)
Based on our statistic with nearly 100 websites on the Internet, at least 20% of 
them have this kind of vulnerability. Cross site scripting (also known as XSS) occurs 
when a web application gathers malicious data from a user. The data are usually 
gathered in the form of a hyperlink which contains malicious content within it. The user 
will most likely click on this link from another website, instant message, or simply just 
reading a web board or email message. Usually, the attacker will encode the malicious 
portion of the link to the site in HEX (or other encoding methods) so the request is less 
suspicious looking to the user when clicked on. After the data is collected by the web 
application, it creates an output page for the user containing the malicious data that was 
originally sent to it, but in a manner to make it appear as valid content from the website. 
Many popular guestbook and forum programs allow users to submit posts with html 
and JavaScript embedded in them. For example, if I was logged in as "john" and read a 
message by "joe" that contained malicious JavaScript in it, then it may be possible for 
"joe" to hijack my session just by reading his bulletin board post. Further details on how 
attacks like this are accomplished via "cookie theft" are explained in detail below.
1.4.4.1. Sample XSS vulnerable web sites
At the time of writing this document, these XSS vulnerabilities can be found on the 
internet: <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
1) Computer Science website, University of Windsor
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There is a XSS vulnerability in Computer Science’s web site, University of Windsor. 
The URL is:
http://web4.uwindsor.ca/units/cs/LNKnowledgeBase.nsf/WH_All!SearchView&Quer 
y=Your_Question&Seq= 1 &SearchFuzzy=TRUE
2) Natural Resource Canada ( Branch of Canada Government) 
http://search.nrcan-mcan.gc.ca/nrcan/NRCan_en.jsp?BATTermO=<script>alert(docu 
ment.cookie)</script>&BATAttr0=Use.Any&BATMaxRecords=10&submit=Search& 
BATTargets=NRCanWWW+Production5&BATTargetDisplays=NRCan+Web+Pages 
&search=search&language=en&doValidation=true
3) Parliament of Canada
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Search/Results.asp ?Language=E&Parl=38&Ses=l&ct=wwwpa 
rl&section=9%2F14%2F2005&search_term=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
4) McGill University
http://www.mcgill.ca/search/?Including=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
5) Ford.ca ( automobile company)
http://www.ford.ca/english/results.asp?QueryText=<script>alert(document.cookie)</s
cript>
6) Canadian Broadcast Company (CBC)
http://bag.cbc.ca/search?ie=&site=CBC&output=xml_no_dtd&client=CBC&lr=&getf 
ields=description&proxystylesheet=CBC&oe=&q=<script>alert(document.cookie)</s 
cript>&x=31 &y= 10
7) Canada.com ( Media company)
http://www.canada.com/search/canadaresults.html?searchfor=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28
document.cookie%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&searchme=canada&image222.x=26&imag
e222.y=8
8) Workopolis ( largest on-line job service provider)
http://search2.workopolis.com/jobshome/db/work.res_list?pi_sort_col=POST_DATE 
&pi_search_id=533474376&pi_page_no=l&pi_msg=&pi_gam_date=&pi_page_id=P 
5&pi_search_filter_flag= 1
In the search box, type in <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
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9) NBC ( US TV station)
http://nbc.resultspage.com/display.php?w=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
10)CTV.ca ( famous Canadian TV station)
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctv/Search?query=<script>alert(document. 
cookie)</script>&chooseSearch=ctv&atoz=-1 &x=30&y=9
1.4.4.2. How to exploit the XSS vulnerability
Here are step-by-step instructions of how to inject HTML code to exploit these 
vulnerabilities.
1) For this URL, user can supply a value as the query string for parameter “Query”. The 
query string will be at the place of “Your_Question”. Atypical XSS attack could input a 
value “<script>alert(”Hello, world”)</script>” for that parameter. Now, the full URL 
will look like:
http://web4.uwindsor.ca/units/cs/LNKnowledgeBase.nsf/WH_All!SearchView&Quer 
y=<script>alert(”Hello, world”)</script>&Seq= 1 &SearchFuzzy=TRUE
2) This request will be transferred to the web server. At the server side, this query string 
looks like a normal string and is sent into database engine for querying.
3) In most cases, this query string will not exist in the database and the web server will
return a message to the client, telling him/her that the query string can not be found.
And the original query string will be copied into the respondent HTML script. E.g., a
returned HTML script looks like:
<html>
<head>
//some header code here 
</head>
<body>
<DIV CLASS="inbody" STYLE="margin-left: 0.5cm; margin-top: 0.5cm"xB>Search 
Results for <script>alert("Hello, world")</scriptx/B>
<p CLASS=inbody ALIGN=LEFT>
</body>
</html>
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We can see the user provided query string is still there.
5) When the explorer receives this response, it will treat the “<script>...</script>” as 
normal HTML script and execute it. Therefore, a message box will jump out in this 
example.
6) For more dangerous usage, an attack could post a malicious URL with embedded 
HTML code to some places (e.g., forum post), and allure a victim to click on this URL. 
After that, this piece of malicious HTML code will be executed on the victim’s 
computer. These malicious HTML code could redirect user to some unpleasant web site, 
stealing user cookie, and more.
7) Solution for XSS attack is to filter user inputs, by prohibiting user from inputting 
dangerous HTML tags like <script>.
1.4.5. SQL-lnjection
SQL injection is a technique for exploiting web applications that use user supplied 
data in SQL queries without stripping potentially harmful characters first.
An example is: there is a login web page that accepts user name and password. 
Inside the program, the user name and password are sent to web server where these 
parameters are used in SQL query like
“select * from users where userid=’” + UserlD + and passwd=”’ + Password. +
In normal usage, the user name and password could be [tom] and [111], then the SQL 
statement will look like:
“ select * from users where userid=’tom’ and passwd=’lH ’ ”.
In attack mode, the intruder will inject SQL keywords into the user name or password 
fields. Say a possible malicious user name and password are [tom] and [aaa’ or ‘ 1’=’ 1]. 
There is a closing single quote after aaa and no closing quote after the last 1 because 
that close quote will be added by program. Now the SQL statement looks like 
“ select * from users where userid=’tom’ and passwd=’aaa’ or 1=1 ”.
The condition in this query is always TRUE. So the attacker will enter the system even 
without the correct password. A simple solution for this kind of attack is to check user
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input. Disable or replace single quotes or double quotes. However, there are still many 
programs not filtering user input. For apache users, they can also enable magic XXX 
feature which will allow system treat single quotes or double quotes in user input as 
normal characters instead of SQL anchor. But this method will cause other compatible 
problem in server-side script. Solution for SQL-Injection attack is also filtering user 
inputs, by prohibiting user from inputting dangerous characters like single-quotes or 
double-quotes. Another solution for Apache web server is to enable “magic quote” 
option, which will automatically pad single-quote or double-quote with ‘V. This will 
make these special characters lose their power in SQL queries.
1.4.6. Denial of Service
For this kind of attack, the attackers exploit some flaws or weak points in a web 
service, and construct malicious inputs that will crash that service or cause it to get into 
an infinite loop, making it unavailable to normal users. After that, normal users cannot 
access this service until it is restarted. For example, a web service provides search 
function that enables users search a centralized database. This operation is quite time 
consuming. If a malicious user initializes 1000 times searches per seconds for 
continuously 10 minutes, the web service could be running out of resources that 
prevents normal users from accessing any functionality in that web service. There is no 
fixed solution for DoS attacks. Depending on different causes for the attack, the 
solution should be different. The solution for the example given above is that a 
well-designed web service limits the search speed from the same user. To detect this 
attack, one can monitor the web request speed and comparing it to a historical average 
speed, and block requests coming at extremely fast speed from the same client.
1.4.7. Buffer-Over-Flow
Another common attack is using buffer-over-flow to attack executable files on web 
server. The precondition for this kind of attack is that the target URL must accept user 
inputs. The attacker will construct an input that is longer than the memory buffer
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allocated in the program running on that URL. For example, if a web service accepts an 
input which is less than 10 characters and does not check the input length, the attacker 
can send out 20 characters and corrupt the program stack that will eventually make the 
program crash. The over-length data will overwrite the return address on the stack or 
data in the heap of the current process. Also some malicious binary code will be 
injected into the stack or heap (the codes are hidden in the long user inputs). When 
current process tries to return to parent process by using that malicious return address, it 
will go to that address and then run malicious codes starting from it. In those codes, the 
attacker can take administrator’s privilege and eventually control the web server. This 
technology is more difficult than DoS attack but will cause more damage than that of 
DoS. Solution for this kind of attack is to filter length of user input. Always check the 
length of user inputted data.
1.4.8. File Disclosure / Arbitrary File Access
This kind of intrusions could make the attackers read confidential files 
(/etc/password), write any files that override important system files to crash system. 
This kind of attack is caused by unfiltered user input. For example, if there is a CGI 
script that can view a specified TXT files in user directory, and the filename is obtained 
from the user. A valid user input should look like “my_file_txt”. But if this script does 
not validate user input, the attacker can use “../../../etc/password” to view the password 
files or other confidential files. Solution for this kind of attack is to filter user input that 
disallow characters like period and forward-slash.
1.4.9. Cookie poison
Cookies are nothing more than a data key-pair, which are stored in a file on the 
client’s hard drive. This pair consists of a name for the cookie, and then a value related 
to that name. For example: 
cookie_for_xyx.com = background_red
The major issue is that you can visit a web site, and they can store information about
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you on your computer. The cookie can store any information it wants, but can store only 
information about you that you give it, such as preferences, or last time you visited that 
page, or even your name. The information stored at the client side can only be retrieved 
by the server that placed the cookie. So, if you go to one site, which stores your name in 
a cookie, no other site can retrieve that cookie, but the site that placed it. Cookies are 
helpful to improve your browsing. If you go to a page such as my.yahoo.com, or 
amazon.com, or any other page that you may personalize, the cookie can save how you 
like the page, and show it to you that way next time. Cookies are also used in shopping 
carts. The server can store your order information in a cookie when you go from 
page-to-page. So when you finalize your order, it can pull the order up all at once. The 
information is safe, because only the computer that stored the information can retrieve 
it. Computer cookies contain bits of information that identify an individual Web user. 
As users browse a Web site and send cookies back, they let an e-business use that 
signature to authenticate and authorize their identity, personalize communications with 
them, monitor their behavior, and speed up their transactions. But all too often, cookies 
are a common target for hackers because they are able to look at the cookie on their 
computer for a given Web site, decipher the pattern or purpose of the cookie, and edit 
the cookie in a way that allows them can gain access to the personal information of 
other users on that site. Using crafted cookie to fool the server is called ‘Cookie Poison’. 
For example, there is a web page in the server side that needs user to provide login 
name and password. If user provides correct login name/password, the server will issue 
a cookie containing session id which is used to identify a valid and logged user. This 
cookie will look like: sessionid=alb2c3d4e5f6 and be stored in user’s computer. If a 
hacker gets this cookie by some ways (by cross site scripting, sniff the network traffic, 
or read cookie data in victim’s computer directly), the hacker will raise a HTTP request 
containing that cookie from the attacker’s machine. When the server side gets this 
request, it will take it as valid and not ask for authentication any more.
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1.5. Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
IDS is the abbreviation of Intrusion Detection System.
Generally speaking, there are two main kinds of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
[BK03]:
•  Network-based IDS (NIDS), which obtains data by monitoring the traffic in the 
network, usually by using some network sniffer tools, e.g., tcpdump.
•  Host-based IDS (HDDS), which obtains data from a single host, e.g., the Windows 
2003 Server’s log file.
Intrusion detection technologies will fall into two categories:
•  Misuse detection, which uses patterns of well-known attacks or weak spots of the 
system to identify intrusions.
•  Anomaly detection, which tries to formulate the normal usage patterns and 
determine whether deviations from these normal patterns are intrusions.
How to determine the quality or accuracy of an IDS? There are several key 
criteria([BK03]):
•  Detection rate, which is the percentage of attacks that a system detects, e.g., there 
are 100 types of attacks in the data, if the IDS detects 80 of them, then the detection 
rate for this IDS is 80%.
•  False positive rate, which is the percentage of normal data that the IDS falsely 
determines to be intrusions, e.g., there are 100 normal TCP connections in the data, 
if the IDS misjudges 10 connections containing intrusion, then the false positive 
rate for this IDS is 10%.
There are inherent tradeoffs between detection rate and false positive rate. The false 
positive rate normally increases as the detection rate increases. A good IDS should have 
high detection rate with tolerable low false positive rate. From the data-centric point of 
view, we can consider intrusion detection as a data analysis process. Anomaly detection 
is about finding the normal usage patterns from the audit data, whereas misuse 
detection is about finding the patterns of intrusion, and then using these patterns to 
inspect audit data[SLM98]. Audit data can be obtained from many sources. For
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example, audit data can be obtained on UNIX operating system by collecting user login 
name, login time, duration of operating, command list being executed, etc. For network, 
the audit data could be the raw packet data which can be obtained through sniff tools, 
and these audit data need some complex pre-processing before applying data mining 
methods on them.
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2. Related works
In the past 20 years, a lot of research (Swatch[ET93], STAT [IKP95], 
WWWstat[Fie96], Autobuse[Tay98], Logscanner[CR98], MADAM ID[LSM98-1], 
[LSM98-2], CyberCop[NA98], [LSM99-1], [LSM99-2], [ADD00], [CG00], [DsOl], 
ADAM[BCJ+01-1], [BCJ+01-2], [BCH+01], [BCJ+01-1], [EKL+02], [HLL+02], and 
[KV03]) have been done in the intrusion detection area, and many IDSs (intrusion 
detection system) have been proposed. Most of them focus on general network 
intrusion detection, which is a super class of web service intrusion detection. Web 
service intrusion detection can be seen as a kind of network intrusion detection. IDSs 
designed for general network intrusion detection are not efficient or even useless in web 
intrusion detection. Because many web attacks may focus on applications that have no 
evidence on the underlying network or system activities. Hence, they are seen as 
normal traffic to general network IDSs and pass through the IDS successfully. However, 
understanding traditional network intrusion detection system is still important since the 
fundamental theories for them are the same. For misuse model, both of them try to 
abstract the nature of attacks into signatures that are used to match the intrusion. For 
anomaly model, both of them are formulating the nature of NORMAL usage into rules 
and any deviation from them could be seen as intrusion. To formulate the normal usage 
rules, data mining technologies can be used in both scenarios.
Firstly, the concepts of intrusion detection system are introduced. Following that is 
theory of network intrusion detection including misuse model and anomaly model 
using data mining technologies. Next are introductions to recent research on web 
intrusion detection and their limitations.
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2.1. Network Intrusion Detection
2.1.1. Intrusion detection with misuse model
Misuse detection systems encode the sequence of actions of a known intrusion into 
signature, and use this signature to match the arriving actions sequences to detect 
known intrusions. The main shortcomings of such systems are: known intrusions have 
to be analyzed by human experts to form signatures and hand-code these signatures into 
IDS systems. And they are unable to detect any future unknown intrusions that have no 
matched signatures in the systems. Although analyzing new intrusions and updating 
their new signatures into systems manually could solve this problem, it still involves 
too much human work and reacts very slowly to new intrusion breakout scenarios. 
Examples of these systems are SNORT [Roe99], STAT [IKP95], and most antivirus 
software like Norton antivirus software. SNORT [Roe99] is an open source IDS. It uses 
signatures of known attacks to detect intrusions. There are many detection rules in 
SNORT. A sample rule to detect P2P software looks like:
alert tcp $HOME_NET any <> $EXTERNAL_NET 8875 (msg:"P2P Napster Server 
Login"; flow:established; content:"anon@napster.com"; classtype:policy-violation; 
sid:565; rev:6;).
Here, the signature in this rule is (content:anon@napster.com), which means any packet 
that contains this string could be a P2P traffic.
2.1.2. Intrusion detection with anomaly model
Traditional anomaly detection systems establish normal usage patterns using 
domain knowledge or statistical measures on system features, and judge if deviation 
from these normal usage patterns is intrusion. The main shortcomings of these systems 
are: they will cause a high false positive rate (i.e. previous unseen usages are misjudged 
as anomalies even though they are normal); and those usage patterns are manually 
established based on domain knowledge, so they are specific to such domains and
- 2 0 -
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
SensorWeblDS: A Sensor with Misuse and Anomaly Based Data Mining Technique for Web Intrusion Detection
cannot be applied to other domains directly. For example, the firewall system for 
University of Windsor is an anomaly detection system. It only allows connections to 
well-known ports from outside, e.g., 80(http), 22(ssh), etc., other kinds of connections 
are not trusted and blocked. This will limit many normal usages such as ftp. And this 
also cannot prevent those kinds of attacks that embed themselves into http protocol. 
Recent research is aimed at eliminating as much as possible of manual elements while 
building an intrusion detection system. From the data-centric point of view, intrusion 
detection can be considered as a data analysis process. Anomaly detection is used to 
find the normal usage patterns from the audit data, whereas misuse detection is used to 
find the patterns of intrusion, and then using these patterns to inspect audit data for 
intrusion detection [SLM98]. Detect intrusions using data mining was first proposed by 
W. Lee and S.J. Stolfo in [LS98]. The goal is to eliminate the need for manually 
analyzing and encoding intrusion patterns, as well as the guesswork in selecting 
statistical measures for normal usage profiles. The idea is: using association rules to 
guide audit data gathering during data pre-processing stage, using frequent episodes to 
guide feature selection, and building up a classification model based on training audit 
data to classify future audit data into different classes (i.e. normal usages or intrusions).
1) Data pre-processing
The network traffic is bit stream, e.g., “010001111”. First job for data 
pre-processing is to locate packets in the bit stream, recognize the protocol and store 
them as record style. This can be done by network sniff tools like tcpdump. The typical 
output data of tcpdump looks like: timestamp src_ip.src_port -> dest_ip.dest_port: flag, 
which means source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination IP 
address, and TCP flag. An example tcpdump output data is shown in Table 1.
Timestamp Src_ip:src_port Dest_ip:dest_port Flag
1.1 Spoof 1:2012 Victim: 80 SO
1.1 Spoofl:2012 Victim:80 SO
• • .
1.1 Spoof2:5685 Victim:80 SO
Table 1 Example audit data set before pre-processing
It is noticed that different packets that belong to the same connection are saved as
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different records (e.g., the first and second records in the Table). To facilitate data 
mining process, they need to be summarized into connection level, i.e, collapse the 
packets belonging to the same connection. In [Pax98], V. Paxon provided a useful tool -  
Bro, which can reassemble the network traffic into connection level, filter the traffic 
stream into a series of events (e.g., connection being closed normally is an event), and 
execute scripts that contain site-specific event handlers. This is the second 
pre-processing for the audit data. For example, in [LSM98-1], W. Lee used Bro to 
fragment tcpdump output data for data mining use. And in the “connection finished” 
event handler (i.e, the handler that Bro will fire when seeing a FIN flag in the 
connection flag), he outputted a summarized record for each connection. Features in the 
record include timestamp, duration, src_host, dst_host, service(dst_port), 
src_bytes(send_bytes), dst_bytes(received_bytes), flag, and some temporal statistical 
features (e.g., the number of connections in the past 2 seconds that have the same 
destination IP address as the current one). An example output is given in the following 
table. After these two steps of pre-processing, the connection records are ready to be 
used by following data mining algorithms.
Timestamp Duration Service Src_ip D estjp Src_bytes Dst_bytes Flag Number of 
connections in 
past 2 second 
to same 
dest_ip
Other
statistic
features
1.1 0 http Spoofl Victim 0 0 SO 10
1.1 0 http Spoof2 Victim 0 0 SO 11
13.4 60 telnet A D 200 12100 SF 0
Table 2 Example audit data set after pre-processing
2) Applying associating rule mining
Association rules can determine features correlations in the connection records. To 
answer the question “How do we know the training audit data is enough”, Lee proposed 
a novel method in [LSM98-2]. His idea is: use the number of frequent association rules 
as the indicator on whether the audit data is sufficient. That is, when the audit data is 
gathered, they compute the association rules from each new audit data set, and merge 
the new rules into the existing aggregate rule set. The added new rules represent new
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variations of the normal behaviour. When the frequent aggregate rule set stabilizes, i.e., 
no new rules from the new audit data can be added, they stop the data gathering since 
they believe our collected aggregate audit data set has covered sufficient variations of 
the normal behaviour. This approach of merging rules is based on the fact that the 
frequent behaviour types are limited and even the same type of behaviour type will 
have slight differences across audit data sets. There is no perfect match. If they always 
generate and insert new rule sets, the rule number will never stabilize, so instead, they 
combine similar patterns into more generalized ones.
How to combine similar patterns into more generalized ones? Two rules are merged, 
r l and r2, into one rule r, if their right and left sides are exactly the same, or their right 
hand side and left hand side can both be combined, and the support and confident 
values are close. For example, rl is (‘service’ = ‘http’ => ‘src_bytes’ = 50), [0.3, 0.1], 
and records count in audit data is 100; r2 is (‘service’ = ‘http’ => ‘src_bytes’ = 70), [0.25, 
0.1], records count in new audit data is also 100. Then rl and r2 can be combined to 
(‘service’ = ‘http’ => 50 <=‘src_bytes’ <= 70), [(30+25/2), (10+10/2)]
A good example from [LSM98-2] is: mining association rules on one month of 
TCP/IP network traffic data. The X axis is the date and the Y axis is the number of 
mined rules. The five curves are (from up to down): all services, frequent all services, 
frequent http, frequent smtp, frequent telnet. All five curves stabilized after 17th day. 
The frequent all services rules are used as the indicator on whether the audit data is 
sufficient. Then, trained two classification models using first 15 days’ audit data and 
first 17 days’ audit data respectively, and comparing the quality (misclassification rate) 
of these models, the result is not surprising -  they are nearly identical.
3) Use axis attribute to extend apriori algorithm
Lee, Stolfo and Mok in [LSM98-2] implemented the association rules algorithm 
following the idea of Apriori algorithm [AS94] which is introduced in 2.1.1. However, 
the Apriori algorithm is not perfectly suitable for this problem, Lee, Stolfo and Mok in 
[LSM99] proposed an extension to Apriori algorithm: Using the Axis attributes.
One problem for the classic Apriori algorithm is that it does not consider any 
domain knowledge when mining rules, so it will generate many “irrelevant” rules. For
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example, consider the following connection records in table 3:
Time Duration Service Src_bytes Dst_bytes Flag
1.1 10 telnet 100 2000 SF
2.0 2 ftp 200 300 SF
2.3 1 Smtp 250 300 SF
3.4 60 telnet 200 12100 SF
3.7 1 Smtp 200 300 SF
3.8 1 Smtp 200 300 SF
5.2 1 http 200 0 REJ
3.7 2 Smtp 300 200 SF
Table 3 Example for explain of Axis attribute
The Apriori algorithm may generate a frequent rule like (src_bytes = 200 -> flag = 
SF), which is useless because there is no intuition for the association between the 
number of bytes from source (src_bytes) and the normal status (flag = SF). This 
problem is more serious for applying frequent episode mining. To solve this problem, 
Lee, Stolfo and Mok proposed using axis attribute(s) as a form of item constraints. The 
axis attribute(s) is the essential attribute(s) in the record, e.g., “Service” attribute in 
table 3 above. After they got all the frequent association itemsets (or frequent episodes), 
the algorithm need to do a post-inspection work on each itemset, to remove those 
itemsets that do not contain any value belonging to axis attribute. By this way, they can 
remove the correlations among non-attributes that are not interesting. For example, in 
the upper example, when getting a frequent association itemset (src_bytes = 200, flag = 
SF), they find no axis attribute value appears in this itemset, so it is not included.
It needs to be pointed out that there is an error in [LSM99] about the process of axis 
attribute. It suggests during candidate generation, an itemset must contain value(s) of 
the axis attribute(s). However, this may eliminate these itemsets too early and make 
them not have the future opportunity to be joined with other qualified candidate 
itemsets. So, this inspection job should be started after all frequent itemsets have been 
generated, although this may loose some efficiency.
4) Using level-wise approximate mining algorithm
This algorithm is used to find the low frequency but important patterns. In daily 
network traffic, some services (connections) like gopher happen for low occurrences.
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Yet their patterns are still needed to be merged into the network traffic profile. 
Otherwise these services will be misclassified as intrusions in anomaly detection 
system. But if they use a very low support value for the data mining algorithms, they 
will get a very large number of unnecessary patterns. So Lee, Stolfo and Mok proposed 
this level-wise approximate mining algorithm to mine low frequent but important
frequent episodes, in [LSM99]. As shown in the figure 2:
Input: the terminating minimum support sO, the initial minimum support si, and the
axis attribute(s)
Output: frequent episode rules
Begin
(1) RJRestricted = null set;
(2) scan database to form L = {1-itemsets that meet sOJ;
(3) s = si;
(4) while (s >= sO) do begin
(5) find serial episodes from L: each episode must contain at least one axis 
attribute value that is not in R_Restricted;
(6) append new axis attribute values to R_Restricted;
(7) append episode rules to the output rule set Rules;
(8) s = s/2; /*  use a smaller support value for the next iteration */ 
end while
end
Figure 2 Level-wise approximate mining of frequent episodes
The idea of this algorithm is to first find all the episodes with high frequent axis 
attribute values, and then iteratively lower the support threshold to find the low 
frequent episodes with axis values, but this axis values must be a new axis value which 
have not appeared before. For example, at first round (line 5), they find a frequent 
episodes -  (service = smtp, src_bytes = 200), (service = smtp, src_bytes = 200) -> 
(service = smtp, dst_bytes = 300), [0.60, 0.10, 2s], which means if there is a smtp 
connection with src_bytes of 200, followed by another smtp connection with src_bytes 
of 200, then in 2 seconds, there will be a third smtp connection with src_bytes of 300, 
confidence and support are 0.6 and 0.1. Then, in line 6 and 7, they store the axis value 
they find in R_Restricted, which is “smtp”, and put this rule into the output rule set. 
Next, in line 8, they lower the support threshold to 0.05 and find frequent episodes
- 2 5 -
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
SensorWeblDS: A Sensor with Misuse and Anomaly Based Data Mining Technique for Web Intrusion Detection
again in line 5 using lower threshold of 0.05. Because they are running on the same 
dataset L, they will again get the same frequent episode (service = smtp, src_bytes = 
200), (service = smtp, src_bytes = 200) (service = smtp, dst_bytes = 300), [0.60,0.10, 
2s], which they got in last round. But in line 6 they find this axis value “smtp” already 
exists in the R_Restricted. Then, they know this is not a new FP, so they do not include 
this rule. If they get a FP: (service = ftp, src_bytes = 200), (service = ftp, src_bytes = 
200) -> (service = ftp, dst_bytes = 300), [0.70,0.05,2s], they will output this rule since 
the axis value “ftp” is a new one. This process will stop when reaching the terminating 
minimum support SO, say 0.01.
5) Applying frequent episode mining
In [LSM98-1], [LS98], [LSM98-2], Lee, Stolfo and Mok proposed using mined 
frequent episodes from network connection records as guidelines to constructing 
temporal statistical features for building classification models. Suppose they got a set of 
frequent episodes by mining the connection records and
1) For a frequent episode, if the same value of an attribute is repeated several times, 
they should include a corresponding count feature. For example, given FP (service 
= smtp, src_bytes = 200), (service = smtp, src_bytes = 200) (service = smtp, 
src_bytes = 200), [0.81,0.42,140], which implies that in the past 140 seconds, three 
smtp connections appear one by one. Then, they add a feature that counts the 
number of connections having the same service and src_bytes as the current 
connection record in the past 140 seconds.
2) For a frequent episode, if an attribute with different values is repeated several times, 
they add an average feature corresponding to the different values. For example, 
given FP (service = smtp, duration = 2), (service = telnet, duration = 10) -> (service 
= http, duration = 1), [0.81, 0.42, 140]. Then we add a feature representing the 
average duration of all connections in the past 140 seconds.
Another question is what window size in frequent episode is the best. In [LSM98-1], 
the authors repeatedly mined frequent episodes using different window sizes, and got 
an optimal window size from which point the number of frequent episodes became 
stable. They suggested doing this kind of experiment before selecting window size
- 26 -
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
SensorWeblDS: A Sensor with Misuse and Anomaly Based Data Mining Technique for Web Intrusion Detection
because the best window size is different for different audit datasets. However, this 
method is somewhat expensive, is there a better method to calculate the optimal 
window size during mining process? This may be a thing that needs to be further 
considered in the future.
6) Building classification model
After raw audit data pre-processing and feature selection, they used classification 
technique on these audit data to build classification models. In [LS98], [LSM98-1], and 
[LSM98-2], Lee, Stolfo and Mok used RIPPER to build classification models. RIPPER 
is a rule learning program developed by Cohen in [Coh95], The algorithm used by 
RIPPER is more efficient than C4.5 algorithm with the same or better error rate. C4.5 is 
another decision tree induction algorithm that is better than ID3 algorithm.
• Build misuse detection model
Use set of records containing diverse attack as training data to RIPPER program, 
and use the output classification rules as misuse detection model. The input records 
have the class label of attack type, and each attack in the records is clearly labelled.
For example, the input and output for RIPPER is shown in figure 3 and figure 4:
label service flag hot fiuledJogins compromised root-shell so duration ...
normal telnet SF 0 0 0 0 0 10.2
normal telnet SF 0 0 0 3 1 2.1
guess telnet SF 0 6 0 0 0 26.2
normal telnet SF 0 0 0 0 0 126.2 ...
overflow telnet SF 3 0 2 1 0 92.5
normal telnet SF 0 0 0 0 0 2.1
guess telnet SF 0 5 0 0 0 13.9 ...
overflow telnet SF 3 0 2 1 0 92.5
normal telnet SF 0 0 0 0 0 1248 ...
Figure 3 Example input of RIPPER for building misuse detection model
RIPPER role Meaning
guess:- ftiledJogim >=5. If number of tailed logins is greater than 5. then this telnet con­
nection is “guess”, a guessing password attack
overflow :- hot = 3, compromised = 2, 
root_shell = 1
If the number of hot indicators is 3, the number of compromised 
conditions is 2. and a root shell is obtained, then this telnet con­
nection is a twffer overflow attack.
normal:- Inie. If none of the above, then this connection is "normal"
Figure 4 Example output rules of RIPPER for building misuse detection model
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Then, they can use these rule set on new record sets, and classify the record as a kind of 
known attack or normal traffic.
• Build anomaly detection model
With a set of records that contains only diverse normal connection as input training 
data (i.e, no intrusion in the training data), they use RIPPER program to build an 
anomaly detection model containing with classification rules. The output rules should 
reflect most normal connection behaviours, and then can determine whether deviation 
from the established rules is intrusion or not. The input records have the class label of 
service type, i.e, destination port. For example, suppose the input for RIPPER could be 
table 3 above, the output of RIPPER would be (table 4):
RIPPER rule Meaning
http:-service = http, conn_count_2s = 
50-80
If service type is “http” and the connection 
count that has the same dest_addr and 
service as current connection is between 
50 and 80, then the connection is “http” 
type
Anomaly If none of the above, the connection is 
anomaly
Table 4 Example output rules of RIPPER for building anomaly detection model
Then, they can use these rule set on new record sets, and classify the record as a kind of 
known service type or anomaly traffic.
2.1.3. Network IDS Projects using Data Mining
The most famous projects that are using data mining technologies are MADAMID 
([LSM98-1], [LSM98-2], [LSM99-1], [LSM99-2]), ADAM ([BCJ+01-1],
[BCJ+01-2]), and MINDS ([EEL+04], [CEE+06]).
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2.1.4. MAD AMID
MADAMID ([LSM98-1], [LSM98-2], [LSM99-1], [LSM99-1]) is the first and 
best-known project that using data mining in intrusion detection. It was developed and 
maintained by Columbia University.
The characters of this system are:
•  It is a misuse and also an anomaly detection system that uses data mining 
technologies to discover patterns of known attacks and patterns of normal user 
behaviours
•  It uses association rules mining to direct audit data collecting process, and uses 
frequent episode mining to guide feature selection which is discussed.
•  It uses RIPPER program to build classification model from training data.
•  It does not use packet payload, but only TCP head information like Source IP 
Address, Destination IP Address, etc. Because of this nature, this system cannot 
find intrusions embedded in the packet payload, as most web intrusions do.
2.1.5. ADAM
ADAM ([BCJ+01-1], [BCJ+01-2]) is developed at George Mason University. It 
has the following features:
•  Like MADAM ID, It also combines anomaly detection and misuse detection.
•  First, ADAM builds a repository of normal frequent itemsets, using association 
rules mining technology, from training data. And it also builds a classification 
model on training data that contains diverse known attacks.
•  Then, at run-time, ADAM runs association rules mining on a sliding-window in the 
most recent set of TCP connections, and compares the result frequent itemsets with 
those stored in the normal itemset repository, discarding those that are deemed 
normal.
•  With the rest, ADAM uses the classifier that has been previously trained to classify 
the suspicious connections as a known type of attack, an unknown type, or a false
-29-
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
SensorWeblDS: A Sensor with Misuse and Anomaly Based Data Mining Technique for Web Intrusion Detection
alarm.
•  Like MADAMID, ADAM also does not inspect the packet payload to find the 
evidence of intrusion, so it has the same disadvantages of MADAMID. That is, it 
cannot detect intrusions embedded in the packet payload, as most web intrusions 
do.
2.1.6. MINDS
MINDS ([EEL+04], [CEE+06]) stands for Minnesota Intrusion Detection System,
which is pretty similar to ADAM system.
•  It uses SNORT[Roe99], an open source intrusion detection system, to collect basic 
features in network connection data such as source and destination IP addresses, 
source and destination ports, protocols, and calculate statistic features like number 
of flows to unique destination IP addresses inside the network within the last T 
seconds from the same source.
•  Then MINDS compare these connection features with signatures for well-known 
attacks, and report intrusion if it found a match
•  If no match was found with the signatures, MINDS feeds these connection features 
to an anomaly detection module and comparing them with normal connection 
features. The module assigns a score that reflects the deviation from these 
connection features to normal ones.
•  Finally connections that are highly anomalous are analyzed by security analyst to 
determine if they are real intrusions or false alarms.
•  Like MADAMID and ADAM, MINDS also does not take the packet payload into 
consideration for the possibility of intrusion, so it has the same disadvantages of 
MADAMID and ADAM. That is, it cannot find intrusions embedded in the packet 
payload, as most web intrusions do.
2.2. Web Intrusion Detection
There are a few papers and systems dedicated to Web intrusion detecion:
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Swatch[ET93], WWWstat[Fie96], Autobuse[Tay98], Logscanner[CR98], 
CyberCop[NA98], SNORT [Roe99], [ADDOO], [KV03], and mod_Security[I03-l], 
[BP04],
2.2.1. Using misuse model
In [ADDOO], M. Almgren, H. Debar and M. Dacier developed “A Lightweight Tool 
for Detecting Web Server Attacks”. This tool found intrusions by analyzing log files of 
web server. It used signatures to detect known attacks and malicious behavior. It has 
following limitations:
•  It does not implement a real-time detection module even though they suggest it 
could be applied in real-time.
•  As the model proposed above, it does not consider the attack hidden in HTTP 
POST data and cookie data, since it depends on the log functionality of web server 
and most web servers don’t provide the ability to log POST data (cookie data is an 
option not opened by default).
•  It did check the parameter values, but only limited to sensitive keywords that could 
potentially launch an attack. It did not check the parameter length that could cause 
buffer-over-flow attack and parameter presence and order.
Another misuse system that can detect web intrusions is SNORT [Roe99]. By using 
some carefully designed rules and a HTTP preprocessor, SNORT can detect some 
well-known web attacks and use alert the administrator of them. However, as the other 
misuse systems, the rules are defined by experts in this field and have to be updated 
when new attacks are observed. Also by SNORT is hard to detect buffer-over-flow 
attack and DoS attack. Also it does not consider the relationships and intrusion 
evidence among discrete HTTP requests.
2.2.2. Using anomaly model
In [KV03], C.Kruegel and GVigna proposed detecting web-based attack using 
anomaly method. They inspect each single record in web logs which have user input
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parameters within HTTP GET method. The model they built calculates the intrusion 
possibilities for parameter length, character distribution, parameter structure, special 
tokens, parameter presence or absence, and parameter order. Then, the model adds 
these possibilities together and gets the total score. If the total score exceeds some 
pre-defined value, alarm will be raised. The limitation of such system is:
•  It inspects log records separately. However, many useful intrusion proofs are 
hidden in the relationships amongst records. For example, if the same IP address 
tries to access different CGI directories in a short time (say 3 seconds), this could 
be the strong evidence that a malicious user is using some kind of CGI scanning 
tool to search for well-known vulnerable CGIs.
•  It only inspects parameters in HTTP GET method. However, many more 
parameters are transferred in GTTPPOST method and these POST parameters will 
not be recorded in log files by web servers.
•  Also it cannot detect cookie poison attack since it does not use cookie data
2.2.3. Other web intrusion detection systems
There are some other host based intrusion detection tools like Swatch[ET93], 
WWWstat[Fie96], Autobuse[Tay98], Logscanner[CR98], CyberCop[NA98], and 
[BP04], They try to find problems in log files of web server. There are also some 
limitations in these tools: Some of these tools have some knowledge related to web 
server attacks, but others do not even support the encoding scheme for hexadecimal 
characters defined in HTTP (as specified in [1]), which means an attacker can easily 
avoid detection. The language available to express the signatures is limited and 
restricted to pattern matching. There are methods to filter out false alarms, such as 
canceling all events from certain domains, but it would be useful to be able to define 
filters based on other properties. Autobuse[Tay98] allows the specification of a defined 
threshold per host, which allows reports to be suppressed until a given host has 
performed several attacks, but there is no distinction of the severity of received events. 
In [103-1] and [103-2], Ivan developed an Open Source Web Application Firewall
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named modsecurity. It operates as an Apache Web server module or standalone. The 
purpose of ModSecurity is to increase web application security, protecting web 
applications from known and unknown attacks. The highlight of this system is that it 
can not only discover intrusions, but also prevent some basic web intrusions like 
SQL-Injection and XSS attacks, by using filter to remove unpleasant characters in user 
supplied data. If installed as an Apache module, it can monitor user-supplied data from 
all the sources (in URI, cookie, and user data section, will be introduced in later 
chapters). The shortcomings for this system are:
• It cannot detect sophisticated intrusions like buffer-over-flow attack, because it 
does not know that how long the maximum value length should be.
• It does not consider the relationships among consequence events, but only evaluate 
the intrusion possibility on each HTTP request separately. So it cannot detect DoS 
attack.
• In order to monitor user supplied data from all the sources, it has to be installed as 
an Apache module in the same machine as the Apache, which will influent the 
efficiency of the web server. More badly, a hacker could find a bug in this IDS 
system itself and attack it to shutdown the Apache server, in order to launch the DoS 
attack.
2.3. Network sensor
Because some HTTP parameters are not recorded in the web server’s log file, those 
IDS systems that relied on web log files do not have complete HTTP request 
information. If intrusions were embedded in those missing HTTP parameters, these 
IDSs will not find them. This problem can be solved by using network sensor to capture 
raw network packets from the real-time network traffic. And then parse the HTTP 
protocol to get all the parameter information needed.
LIBPCAP [MJ92] and WinPCAP [RD01] are two free programming libraries that 
can be used by programmers to develop network sensor application. LIBPCAP is the 
library for UNIX platform and WINPCAP is for Win32 platform that has the same
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interface as LIBPCAP. By using these two libraries, the network sensor can set the 
network card into promiscuous mode, which allows the network card to receive all 
network packets regardless of the destination of the packets. Otherwise the network 
card can only capture the packets that are destined to it.
The IDS systems reviewed in chapter 2.1 and 2.3, that use LIBPCAP [MJ92] or 
tools built on LIBPCAP as network sensors, are MADAMID [LSM98-1], SNORT 
[Roe99], ADAM [BCJ+01-1], and MINDS [EEL+04], Among them, only SNORT can 
detect some the web intrusions. The others can only detect general network intrusions.
2.4. Association rules mining
Association rule can be used to find correlation among items in a given transaction. 
A well-known example is market basket analysis, which analyzes customer buying 
habits by finding associations between the different items that customers place in their 
shopping baskets. If most customers who buy milk also buy bread, we can put milk and 
bread in the same shelf to increase sales and profit.
Association rule mining was first proposed in [AIS93] which gave a formal 
definition of the problem: LetL= {t, ,i2 } be a set ofliterals, called items. LetDbe
a set of transactions, where each transaction T is a set of items such th a tT c L . 
Associated with each transaction is a unique identifier, called its TID. We say that a 
transaction T contains X, a set of some items in L, if X  c  T . An association rule is an
implication of the form X = > Y  , where X c L , T c L  , and X f | T = <£ . The
rule X  => Y holds in the transaction set D with confidence c if c% of transactions in D 
that contain X also contain Y. The rule X  => Y has support s in the transaction set D if 
s% of transactions in D contain X U T  • An example is shown in figure 5.
HereL = {A,B,C,D,E}.  There are four transactions with TDD 100, 200, 300, and 400. 
Rule {A} => {C} is an association rule because {A} c  L,{B] c  L, and{A}fl{5} = .
The confidence for this rule is 2/2=100%, and the support of this rule is 2/4=50%.
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Database D
TTD Items
100
200
300
400
A C D 
B C E  
A B C E  
B E
Figure 5 Transaction database D
According to [AIS93] and [AS94], the problem of mining association rules can be 
decomposed into the following two steps:
1) Discover the large itemsets, i.e., the sets of itemsets that have transaction support 
above a pre-determined minimum supports.
2) Use the large itemsets to generate association rules for the database.
For example, in step 1) find a large itemset k = {a, b, c}, in step 2), the nonempty 
subsets of k are {a, b}, {b, c}, {a, c}, {a}, {b}, {c}, then we can generate association 
rules asa Ab  c,a a c  => b , bAc =$  a,a^> b Ac,b => a a c , c  a A b .
Here, we examine several important association rule mining algorithms; some of 
them are commonly used in network intrusion detection.
2.4.1. Apriori algorithm
The Apriori Algorithm was proposed in [AS94], [AS95] and [MTV94]. The basic 
idea is to use short frequent sequence to deduce long frequent sequence. That is, Lt_,, a
set of frequent k-itemsets is used to findLt .
There are two steps to find Lk from Lk_t, i.e. join and prune actions:
1) Join step: the candidate k-itemsets Ck is generated by joining with itself. The 
join Lk_\caLk_\ can be performed if their first (k-2) items are in common. For
example, frequent 2-itemsets {1,3} and {1,5} can be joined as candidate 3-itemset 
{1, 3,5}, while {1,3} and {2,5} is notjoinable.
2) Prune step: Ck is a superset of Lk, i.e., its members may or may not be frequent, but
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all of the frequent k-itemsets are included in Ck. Then, a scan of the database is used 
to determine the count of each candidate in Ck and eliminate the candidates having 
counts less than the minimum support count. Also, remove those candidate 
k-itemsets that have any (k-l)-subset not in LH (i.e. not frequent).
Let’s use an example to explain apriori algorithm. The transaction database is 
shown in figure 5. Suppose the minimal transaction support count is 2.
1) In the first round, we scan the database D to calculate the occurrence count for each 
item, and get candidate 1-itemset C,. Applying the minimal support requirement,
we can get large 1-itemset L ,.
2) In the second round, use L,ooL, to generate the candidate 2-itemsetC2. Next, scan 
the database D again to find the support count for each candidate item inC2. Then 
eliminate the candidate 2-itemset in C2 which has support count less than 2, and 
get large 2-itemset L2.
3) In the third round, we use L2°°L2 to generate candidate 3-itemset C3 = {{BCE}}. 
Next, test if any 2-subset in C3 is inL2. We find {B C}, {B E}, and {C E} are all 
in L2. Then transactions in database D are scanned to determine L ,.
4) Use to generate candidate 4-itemsets, we get <J>, and then the algorithm 
stops. All the frequent itemsets are Lt [ jL2 [ jL3.
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C1 L1
TID Set of Itemsets Itemset Supply
Scan D 100 {A},{C},{D} Prune {A} 2
— ► 200 {B},{C},{E} ------------------ ► {B} 3
300 {A},{B},{C},{E} {C} 3
400 {B}.{E} {E} 3
Itemset
Scan 0
C2
Itemset Supply
{AB> 1
{AC} 2
{AE} 1
{BC} 2
{BE} 3
{CE} 2
Prune
L2
Itemset Supply
{AC} 2
{BC} 2
{BE} 3
{CE} 2
C3 C3 L3
I Itemset Scan D
{BCE}
Itemset Supply Prune Itemset Supply
{BCE} 2 {BCE} 2
Figure 6 Large itemset generation process
J. Han, and M. Kamber in [HKOO] gave two main limitations for this algorithm:
1) It may need to generate a huge number of candidate sets. From the previous 
example, we can see every round, the algorithm has to use join operation to 
generate candidate (K+l)-itemsets.
2) It may need to repeatedly scan the database and check a large set of candidates by 
pattern matching. This is especially the case for mining long patterns.
2.4.2. FP-growth Algorithm
One big efficiency problem of Apriori Algorithm is that it may need to generate a 
huge number of candidate sets. Although some variations of the algorithms try to 
reduce the candidate sets size, this problem still cannot be avoided. J. Han, J. Pei, Y. Yin 
in [HPYOO] gave a novel method, FP-growth method, which mines the complete set of
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frequent itemset without candidate generation. The FP-growth method transforms the 
problem of finding long frequent patterns to looking for shorter ones recursively and 
then concatenating the suffix ([HKOO]). It has several benefits:
1) The data structure in FP-tree is compact and informative. Only the frequent 
length-1 items will have nodes in the tree. And the frequent items are ordered in 
descending order so that more occurring node will have better chances of sharing 
nodes than less frequent occurring ones, which will significantly reduce the tree 
size. For example, we have frequent 1-itemsets as sl={ {A B }, {B AC}}. The 
occurrences for A, B, C are 2, 2, and 1. After ordering in descending order of 
occurrence, the frequent 1-itemsets are s2={ {A B}, {A B C}}. If we build FP-tree 
with si (no order), then we get 5 nodes FP-tree, as shown in the left tree of figure 7. 
If building with s2 (ordered), then the FP-tree will only has 3 nodes, as shown in the 
right tree of figure 7.
root
A:1 8:1
B:1 A:1
C:1
root
A:2
B:2
C:1
Without order With order
Figure 7 Build FP-tree without or with ordering
2) Mining FP-tree starts from a frequent length-1 pattern (as an initial suffix pattern), 
examines only its conditional pattern base, construct its conditional FP-tree, and 
perform mining recursively with such a tree. No candidate itemset generated.
3) Third, the search technique employed in mining is a partitioning-based, 
divide-and-conquer method rather than Apriori-like bottom-up generation of 
frequent itemsets combinations. This dramatically reduces the size of conditional 
pattern base generated at the subsequent level of search as well as the size of its
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corresponding conditional FP-tree.
4) The algorithm only needs to scan the full database twice.
Let’s use the example database given in table 5 to explain the algorithm.
1) Scan the database D and derive the frequent 1 -itemsets and their support counts. Let 
the minimum support count be 2. And sort the set of frequent items in the order of 
descending support count, get list L = [B:3, C:3, E:3, A:2]. D is deleted because its 
support count is less than 2.
TID Items Ordered Frequent Items
100 AC D CA
200 B C E B C E
300 A B C E B C E A
400 B E BE
Table 5 Ordered Frequent items
2) Now construct the FP-tree as follows. First, create the root of the tree, labelled with 
“null”. Scan database D for a second time. The items in each transaction are 
processed in L order and a branch is created for each transaction. The first 
transaction “T100: C A” will lead to constructing the first branch of the tree with 
two nodes. The second transaction, “T200: B C E”, leads to constructing a different 
branch beside the branch of the first transaction. The third transaction, “T300: B C 
E A”, has the same prefix as T200, so we increase the count of node B C and E to 2 
and add a new node as “A :l”. The process continues until all ordered items are 
iniserted.
3) To facilitate tree traversal, an item header table is built so that each item points to its 
occurrences in the tree via a chain of node-links as the items are being inserted in 
the tree. Then the FP-tree looks like:
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Support count
Item ID Node-iink
B 3 .. . .
C 3
E 3 X
A 2
Figure 8 A FP-tree that stores compressed, frequent pattern information
4) Next, is to mine the FP-tree, which is summarised in table 6 and detailed as follows. 
First consider node A which is the last node of the last item in header linkage, L and 
a leaf node in the tree. Consider A as a suffix, its corresponding two prefix paths are 
{(C: 1)} and {(E C B: 1)}, which form its conditional pattern base. Its conditional 
FP-tree contains no node because none of the items in the conditional pattern base 
can reach the requirement of minimum support count. For node E, we get the 
conditional pattern base {(B C:2)} and {(B: 1)}. Its conditional FP-tree contains 
only one branch <B:3, C:2>. This single branch can generate all the combinations 
of frequent patterns: B C E:2, B E:3, C E:2. The rest of the nodes, C and B, are 
mined the same way.
Item Conditional pattern base Conditional FP-tree Frequent patterns
A {(C: 1), (EC B:l)} Null None
E {(B C:2), (B: 1)} <B:3, C:2> B C E:2, B E:3, C E:2
C {(B:2)} <B:2> B C:2
B None Null None
Table 6 mining the FP-tree
There are also some limitations to the FP-growth algorithm:
1) The algorithm recursively builds the conditional pattern base and conditional 
FP-tree. This potentially needs a lot of memory. If the scale grows to a level that the
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conditional FP-tree cannot be put into the main memory, the efficiency of 
FP-growth will be low because it needs to spend a lot of time on disk I/O. In 
[HPYOO], the authors gave some discussion regarding this concern and provided an 
alternative: that is first partition the big database into a set of small projected 
databases, and then construct FP-tree with each projected database.
2) It needs to sort the frequent 1-itemsets in descending order and build the FP-tree in 
that order. This is only applicable to the circumstances that the sequence order does 
not matter. For those applications where sequence order is important (e.g., web log 
sequential pattern mining, where frequent pattern ABC and CBA are not identical), 
we cannot use this algorithm or we have to use it without ordering, which may 
cause a big FP-tree.
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3. Proposed solutions for web attack detection
This chapter gives details of the proposed algorithms used in SensorWeblDS. This 
system combines the powers of anomaly detection and misuse detection. It uses the 
data mining technology to detect unknown intrusions and uses signatures of known 
attacks to detect existing intrusions. Thesis proposes a new algorithm that uses standard 
deviation to calculate the maximum length for parameter values. Also, It uses software 
network sensors to monitor real-time network traffic in order to receive all parameters 
in HTTP request and improve both quality of detection and detection response time. It 
is different from existing web intrusion systems, which get HTTP requests only from 
web log files that contain parts of user inputs, our system collects data from both 
real-time network data and web log files to ensure all user supplied data are under 
monitoring. In HTTP request processing, existing web IDSs audit each record 
separately, while our system considers the relationships among records in a time 
window. This is based on the fact that it is always suspicious if the same user behind the 
requests causes lots of error in a short period of time.
The web intrusion detection system (SensorWeblDS) proposed by thesis is divided 
into three programs: network sensor (chapter 3.3), log digger (chapter 3.4), and audit 
engine (chapter 3.2). The network sensor is used to capture all HTTP requests at 
real-time from network traffic and sends them to audit engine for intrusion analysis. 
The log digger is used to extract HTTP requests from web server’s log files and send 
them to audit engine for intrusion analysis. The audit engine is the brain and 
decision-maker of SensorWeblDS system.
The SensorWeblDS is running on two stages: learning stage and detecting stage: 
In the learning stage, log digger or network sensor abstracts useful information (like 
URI, parameter list, time, client IP, etc.) from the log file and sends them to the audit 
engine as training data. The audit engine uses association rule mining algorithm to 
deduce the parameter presence and orders (e.g., parameter list “abc” is different to lists
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“bac” and “ab”, see 3.2.1 for detail). And it uses a new algorithm to calculate the 
maximum value length (see 3.2.2 for detail). The learned information is stored in the 
audit engine as basis to be compared with future audit data. This process can be seen in 
figure 9 below:
web server 
log file
access records
Log digger 
program
Formatted HTTP request records 
Incl. URI, Parameterjist, time, etc.
1r
Audit engine 
(In Learning 
mode)
Frequent 
Presenc 
and maxi 
ler
Parameter 
js, orders, 
mum value 
gths
r
torajge
Figure 9 Learning period
In the detecting stage, HTTP requests coming from network sensors or log files are 
transported into the audit engine to do anomaly analysis. The engine calculates an 
anomaly score for each request based on frequent parameter rules and maximum value 
length (learned in learning stage) and some pre-defined attack signatures. If the 
anomaly score is higher than a maximum allowed value, this record is marked as 
intrusion and outputted to a terminal. The terminal could be a screen device or text file
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using I/O redirection. This process can be seen in figure 10 below:
Network
Sensor
Log diggei^
Attack
signatures Audit Engine
Frequent parameter 
presences, orders, 
and maximum value 
—length
Intrusions found
A___
Output 
(screen or 
file)
Figure 10 Audit period at run-time
This architecture is very flexible and powerful. The audit engine module can be 
easily connected to a database and stores each received record into it. Other data mining 
tools can analyze the database later.
3.1. Audit Engine
When the audit engine is launched, it is firstly running in the training mode. It calls 
algorithms 3 to calculate parameter presence and order, and calls algorithm 4 to 
calculate maximum value length. This process is described in figure 11:
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Algorithml AuditEngine_Leam(record_set)
Input: record_set -  a set of records containing URIs with parameters and values 
Output: URIsJFP -  an array stroing URIs with frequent parameter lists. For each 
URI, there is a list consisting frequent parameters; URIs_MAX_LEN - a three 
dimensional array containing maximum allowed value length 
Begin
(1) Call FindFrequentParameterAndOrder(record_set, 80%, 0 ) with 80% 
confidence and a x is jtem jd x  as first index -  0, to find frequent parameter 
presence and orders /*See algorithm 3*/
(2) Call CalcMaxValueLen(record_set), to find maximum value length /*See 
algorithm 4*/
End
Figure 11 Algorithm 1 -AuditEngine_Learn
After that, the audit engine is running is detecting mode. For each new incoming 
HTTP record, the system calculates its anomaly score by going through five 
checkpoints, and adds score for each checkpoint together. After the checks, if the total 
anomaly score is greater than a maximum allowed value, this HTTP record is marked as 
anomaly. This maximum allowed value is an adjustable value based on experimental 
result and can be changed to make balance between high detecting rate (use small value 
to catch every suspicious request) and low false alarm (use large value to reduce false 
alarms). These five checkpoints are:
•  In those parameter values, check for forbidden keywords. This is useful to find 
XSS (see chapter 1.4.4) and SQL-Injection (see chapter 1.4.5) attacks.
•  Test parameter value lengths to see if they are longer than the maximum allowed 
value lengths for that same URI and parameter name. These maximum allowed 
value lengths are learned in the training period by algorithm 4. This checkpoint is 
useful to find buffer-over-flow attacks.
•  For the parameter list, comparing its parameter presence and order with frequent 
parameter lists for the same URI. If that was not found, an anomaly score is added 
to the total score. This is useful to discover faked HTTP requests that are generated 
by hack tools. The frequent parameter lists are learned in the training period by 
algorithm 3.
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If web server returned an error code for this request, count it into the total anomaly 
score.
Check relationship among multiple records to take historical damage into 
consideration that is caused by the same user. This is useful to detect probe attacks. 
This algorithm is shown in figure 12 and 13:
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Figure 12 Overall system algorithm workflow
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Algorithm2 AuditEngine_Main(uri, param jist, tjrecv, c_ip, ret_code, Max_Score)
Input: uri -  the URI in the HTTP request; param jist -  parameter list in the form of 
[param_name, param_value]; t_recv -  time of receiving; c j p  -  client ip address; 
ret_code -  code returned by web server; Max_Score -  maximum allowed anomaly 
score
Output: TRUE if this HTTP request is an intrusion, FALSE otherwise 
Begin
/*  check forbidden keywords to uncover XSS and SQL-inject attacks
FK Jist is a static array storing forbidden keywords which are used in XSS and
SQL-injection attacks. It is defined in 3.1.3.2 */
(1) For each keyword k in FKJist
if( k is found in parameter lis t)
score = score + ANOMALYJSCORE1 ;
/*Call function EvaluateValLen to check parameter value length to find 
Buffer-over-flow attack*/
(2) For each param_name in the param jist
If EvaluateValLen(uri, param jist) returns True /*See algorithm 5*/
Score = score + ANOMALY_SCORE2;
/*check parameter presence and order to discover faked HTTP request that is 
generated by hack tool. URIs_FP is an array storing URIs with frequent parameter 
lists which is an output from algorithm 1 */
(3) If( param jist is not in the URIs_FP[uri]. frequent_ parameterjist)
score = score + ANOMALYJSCORE3;
/ *check server return code to count on server reaction to this request 
ERR_CODE list is an array storing most HTTP error codes defined in 3.1.3.1*/
(4) If( ret_code is in the ERRjCODEJist)
score = score + anomaly score for that error code;
/*check relationship among multiple records to add historical damage caused by 
the same user, used to detect probe attack*/
(5) score = score + Call function relation_check( c jp ,  t_recv); /*See algorithm 6*/
(6) If( score > Max_Allowed_Score)
return TRUE; /*  report as an anomaly */
Else
return FALSE /*  report as normal request */
End
Figure 13 Algorithm 2 -  AuditEngine_Main
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3.1.1. Anomaly detection with data mining technologies
The advantage of anomaly detection is that it does not need previous knowledge 
about new attacks. It formulates the normal usage patterns for HTTP requests and 
determines whether deviations from these normal patterns are intrusions. In order to get 
these patterns, anomaly detection needs to learn on training data first before it can be 
applied on real audit data. For HTTP requests, the normal patterns are the presence and 
order of the parameters appearing in those requests. This is because that the HTML 
codes of the web page generating these HTTP requests are fixed. They always generate 
the same parameter presence and order regardless of what user has inputted. Also these 
parameter values should have maximum lengths. For example, there is a login web 
page that lets user input his username and password for authentication. Once the user 
has filled both parameters and click ‘submit’ button, the web page generates a request to 
the web server in the following HTTP format:
“GET /login.asp?usemame=neo&password=123 HTTP/1. l\r\n”. The fact is, no matter 
what value that users input into those fields, this web page will always generate the 
same number of parameter in the same order. However, the hacker will not input data 
through the official web page because there may be some input checking mechanisms 
in the HTML codes that prevent them from inputting malicious values. They use hack 
tools to send out crafted HTTP requests that may not obey the order and presence in the 
regular way. It’s also suspicious if a HTTP request missed some parameters from 
normal request. Some Web applications try to use sessions to track user status at the 
first time when he accesses them, by issuing hidden parameters in the HTML code or 
cookies to the users. When the same user speaks to web server later, those hidden 
parameters or cookies are embedded in his HTTP requests. If a hacker reaches a web 
page by some hacking skills without walking through a series of ‘official’ operations 
(e.g., access authentication page first), his session will miss those hidden parameters or 
cookies (these parameters are issued in the ‘official’ operations). Hence, their HTTP 
requests do not contain those hidden parameters. This can be a proof of intrusion.
For the maximum allowed value length issue, the web service may only allocate
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100 characters’ storage space to hold the username and another 100 to hold password. 
So the legal length of ‘username’ or ‘password’ must be no longer than 100 characters, 
otherwise it will cause the web service overflows its buffer. And in most cases users 
will not bother themselves by using very long username and password (e.g., many 
people like to use “password” shorter than 8 characters). Based on this fact, if the web 
service received a request with “username” length of 500, it is most likely a 
buffer-over-flow attack.
So the idea is, the IDS analyzes parameters coming along with the same URI and 
finds the regulation in the parameters’ presence, order and maximum value length. At 
the detecting time, when it finds a request violate the regulation rule, the request can be 
marked as anomaly. E.g., Using the same login page above, the following three HTTP 
requests are all suspicious requests:
“GET /login.asp?password=123 HTTP/1. l\r\n”. — missing parameter username 
“GET /login.asp?password=123&usemame=abc HTTP/1. l\r\n”. — wrong order 
“GET /login.asp?usemame=1000 ‘a’s HTTP/1. l\r\n”. — parameter value too long 
For case 1 and 2, it implies the user is trying to access the web service NOT through the 
official web page. For case 3, it implies the user is trying to overwhelm the input buffer.
3.1.1.1. Analysis parameter presence and order use 
association rules mining
To obtain the regular parameter presences and orders, we cannot just count the 
parameter numbers and use it to match each request, since the attacker may add one 
new parameter and remove one old parameter to make the total number correct. Instead, 
our system uses data mining technology to find common parameter presence and orders 
for a specific URI. Given a set of URIs with parameter lists, the system uses Apriori 
algorithm ([AS94]) to find the frequent URI-> parameterjist. The desired frequent 
rules must use URI as antecedent, e.g., [“/login.asp”->”usemame”, “password”]. But 
traditional Apriori algorithm produces all frequent rules regardless of this constrain. 
Then some frequent rules are not started with URI and are useless to the system. E.g.,
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rule [“usemame”->’’password”] is useless because we do not know which URI this rule 
is related to. To solve this problem, we modified standard Apriori algorithm to add a 
new input parameter -  axis item. This forces all frequent rules to be started with this 
axis item.
The formal algorithm is described as Algorithm 3 in figure 14:
Algorithm 3: FindFrequentParameterAndOrderf param jist, cfd, axis_item_idx) 
Description: given a set of URIs with parameter lists, find the frequent URI parameter 
list.
Input: param jist -  a record set o f URIs and their parameter lists observed. Each record 
starts from a URI name followed by parameter list; cfd -  desired confidence for the 
frequent rules; axisjtem  -  all frequent rules should start from this item. It is always the 
URI name.
Output: frequent URI -^parameter Jist.
Begin
(1) Apply Apriori algorithm ([AS94]) on the param jist to find frequent rules having 
confidence greater than cfg, storing them in array x;
(2) For each rule r in array x
if( r is not started by r[ax isjtem jdx] ) 
delete rfrom x
(3) return x;
End
Figure 14 Algorithm 3 - FindFrequentParameterAndOrder
For example:
1) We get inputs record set (table 7) with minimum confidence 90% and axis item
index 0
Record # Parameter List
1 “/login.asp”, “username”, “password”
2 “/login.asp”, “username”, “password”
3 “/login.asp”, “username”, “password”
4 “/login.asp”, “username”
Table 7 Parameter list
2) Applying standard association rule mining algorithm on this record set with
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confidence 75%, and get frequent association rules 
“/login.asp”-^ “username”, “password”, confidence=75%
“/login.asp”->”usemame”, confidence=100%
“/login.asp”->”password”, confidence=75%
“username”-^ ’’password”, confidence=7 5 %
“/login.asp”, confidences 100%
“username”, confidences 100%
“password”, confidences 100%
3) Eliminate those rules that are not started from “login.asp”. So finally, we get 
frequent parameter lists:
“/login.asp”->“usemame”, “password”, confidences75%
“/login.asp”->”usemame”, confidences 100%
“/login.asp”-^”password”, confidences75%
“/login.asp”, confidences 100%
4) In the detecting stage, requests with parameter “username” only or “password” only 
or “password, username” will be assigned anomaly scores.
3.1.1.2. Algorithm to calculate possible maximum 
allowed length for parameter value
Physically, all user input values can be seen as string type. All string value should 
have a maximum length on the web server side. We can use this maximum allowed 
value length to detect buffer overflow attacks. However, this maximum length exists in 
the source code on the server side and is unknown to our EDS. There is NO way for IDS 
to learn this length automatically. A simple implementation may use the maximum 
length observed in the history data in web logs as the maximum length allowed in the 
source code. But this information is obviously not accurate and will inevitably generate 
lots of false alarm. Use the example above, if the maximum allowed ‘username’ is 64 in 
the source code. However, the observed maximum length in web log is only 32. If a 
new request comes with length 40, the IDS will think this is an attack.
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To solve this problem, we use standard deviation algorithm in probability and 
statistic theory to calculate the normal distribution of parameter value length, and use it 
to predict future maximum value length. In practice ([WikOl]), one often assumes that 
the data are from an approximately normally distributed population. If that assumption 
is justified, then about 68.27% of the values are within 1 standard deviation of the mean, 
about 95.46% of the values are within two standard deviations and about 99.73% lie 
within 3 standard deviations. This is known as the "68-95-99.7 rule". Typically, 
however, this assumption becomes less accurate in the tails. This rule can be shown in 
figure 15, which is coming from reference [WikOl].
2.1%
0 .1%
-2 a  - la  \i la 2a 3a
Figure 15 68-95-99.7 rule in standard deviation
If a random variable X takes on the values xl,...,xN (which are real numbers) with 
equal probability, then its standard deviation can be computed as follows ([wikOl]). 
First the mean of X is defined as:
-  1 A  X,  +  X j  -----+  X N
X  =  —  > Xf  =  — ------------------- —,
N m  N
Next, the standard deviation is defined as:
Using this formula in our system is more complex than that on a single variable X. 
Because:
1) Each parameter in an URI is treated as a variable X with a series of values. These 
values come from this parameter in different HTTP request. E.g., for ‘username’ 
parameter, user A inputs “mary” and user B inputs “Joe”, so this parameter has a
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series of values 4 and 3.
2) Each URI has more than one parameter. E.g., URI “/login.asp” has two parameters 
-  “username” and “password”. Both of them should be calculated independently 
using standard deviation formula.
3) Each web server has more than one URI. The system should repeat the same 
computation in 2) for each URI.
Here is a full example: a web server has two URIs -  “/login.asp” and “/sum.asp”. Each 
of them has two parameters and each parameter has multiple values from multiple 
HTTP requests. The HTTP requests are (for clarity purposes, we hide irrelevant 
information other than URIs and parameters):
‘ GET “login.asp?usemame=mary&password=” 123” ’
‘ GET “login.asp?usemame=joe&password=”12345” ’
‘ GET “login.asp?usemame=jeffery&password=” 12345678” ’
‘ GET “sum.asp?from=2005/01/01&to=”2006/01/01” ’
‘ GET “sum.asp?from=2005/02/12&to=”2005/l 1/01” ’
‘ GET “sum.asp?from=2005/10/01&to=”2006/10/01” ’
This information can also be formatted and put into table 8.
URI Parameter Values
“login.asp” “username” 4(“mary”) 3(“joe”) 7(“jeffery”)
“password” 3(“123”) 5(“12345”) 8(“12345678”)
sum.asp “from” 10(“2005/01/01”) 10(“2005/02/12”) 10(“2005/10/01”)
“to” 10(“2006/01/01”) 10(2005/11/01”) 10(“2006/10/01”)
Table 8 Example input to calculate maximum value length
The question is to calculate the 3-standard deviation for each parameter for each URI. 
And the final result should be in the form as URI (Parameter, 3-STD_DEV). E.g., 
“login.asp” (“username”, 9.77), (“password”, 9.47)
“sum.asp” (“from”, 10), (“to”, 10)
The algorithm used by our system works like this:
1) To facilitate the calculation, scan the input HTTP request set R and format them 
into a three-dimensional array URIs_MAX_LEN. The first dimension is the URI
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name, the second dimension is the parameter name, and the third dimension is the 
value length. Because it does not know how long each dimension would be, the 
algorithm uses linked list to implement the three dimensional array. Its lists look 
like figure 16 in the memory:
username
password
Figure 16 Linked list before calculation for 3-standard deviation
2) When the array is constructed, calculate the 3-standard deviation for each 
parameter at dimension two, and store it in the parameter node.
3) Then the result looks like figure 17. The possible maximum value length for each 
parameter is inserted into the node representing that parameter.
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U sernam e
9.77
Figure 17 Linked list after calculation for 3-standard deviation
4) In detect period, we will use the three dimensional array containing the maximum 
allowed value length as shown in figure 17. When a HTTP request comes in, the 
system uses the URI name to search in the first dimension (the URI name 
dimension) of array URIs_MAX_LEN. When a same URI is found, it searches in 
the second dimension (the parameter name dimension) using the parameter name. 
If a same parameter name is found again, it uses the stored maximum allowed 
value length in the parameter node to compare with the current value length, and 
raise an alarm if the current length exceed maximum length. E.g., we have the array 
RUIs_MAX_LEN as shown in figure 17 and a new request with URI “login.asp” 
and parameters “usemame=abcdefghijkl” and “password=lll”. We search in the 
first dimension for URI name “login.asp”. After a match is found, we search in the 
linked list follow that URI node for parameter name “username”, and can find a 
same node with maximum allowed length as 9.77. The new request has the length 
of 12 for “username”, so it is marked as anomaly. Applying the same process for 
parameter “password” will find that the length is valid.
This process can be formulized as Algorithm4 (figure 18) that is used to construct the
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3-dimensional array, and Algorithm 5 (figure 19) that is used to detect if a new HTTP 
request violate the maximal length rule.
Algorithm 4: CalcMaxValueLen( recordjset)
Input: record_set -  a set o f records containing URIs with parameters and values 
Output: a three dimensional array T as shown in figure 17
Description: construct a three-dimensional array from recordjset and calculate the
three-standard deviation for the second dimension
Begin
(1) For each r in record_set 
Begin
(2) Search T with URI in r;
(3) If NOT found a match
(4) create a new entry for the first dimension and attach it to T;
(5) get the pointer o f that dimension as pL;
(6) for each parameter p  in r 
Begin
(7) search p in pL;
(8) if NOTfound a match 
Begin
(9) create a new entry for third dimension and attach it to the pL;
(10) init value counter to 0;
End
(11) add current value length into the third dimension;
(12) increase the value counter for this dimension by 1;
End
End
(13) for each pL in the second dimension ofT  
Begin
(14) calculate the mean and standard deviation STD_DEVfrom the values in third 
dimension
(15) store the value (mean+3 * STD_DEV) in the pL 
End
End
Figure 18 Algorithm 4 - CalcMaxValueLen
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Algorithm 5: EvaluateValLenfuri, p a ra m jis t)
Input: uri -  the URI in the HTTP request; param jist -  parameter list in the form of 
[paramjiame, param_value]; T -  three-dimensional array as shown in figure 17 
Output: if requested value length exceed prediction or not
Description: use the pre-leamed maximal value lengths to evaluate the new coming in
HTTP request
Begin
(1) Search uri in the first dimension ofT;
(2) If found a match 
Begin
(3) get the pointer o f that dimension as pL;
(4) for each parameter p in param jist 
Begin
(5) search p in the pL
(6) if  found a match 
Begin
(7) compare the maximal value length stored in that node with current 
value length;
(8) if  current length is longer
(9) return true;
End
End
End
(10) return false;
End
Figure 19 Algorithm 5 - EvaluateValLen
3.1.1.3. Update learned frequent parameter presence 
and order and maximum allowed value lengths
Currently, all frequent parameter presence and order and maximum value length 
are learned in the training period. After that, in the detection period, these rules and 
values are used to match normal usage pattern. They are not updated after training 
period. The reasons that new parameter rules and maximum value need to be updated 
after the training period are:
•  The administrator may install some new web applications into the web server. So 
these new URIs will not exist in our learned rules. E.g., at the time when the system
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collected the training data, there were 2 web pages on the web server: “/login.asp” 
and “/search.asp”. Then, the system learned all rules related to these two web pages. 
Later after that, the server administrator installed a new web page “/add.asp”. Now 
this new web page does not appear in the learned knowledge base, and intrusions 
related to this web page cannot be found by the old rules.
•  The administrator may update some old web applications in the web servers by 
adding, deleting or changing some parameters. E.g., the web page “login.asp” used 
“username” and “password” in the first version in the training period. After that, 
the administrator updated this web page and added a new parameter “location”. 
Then this parameter is not included in the rules. New HTTP request including this 
new parameter will be marked as anomaly incorrectly.
To keep the rules information up to date, there should be some ways to update them. 
The solution for this problem is left for future work. Here are some suggestions: after a 
period of time (e.g., 1 day), do the whole training work with new training data and 
replace old rules with new ones; develop some incremental methods to update the 
learned rules, which can be run in another background process to update rules with new 
incoming data. These thoughts will be left for future consideration.
3.1.2. Calculate relationships among multiple records
The idea behind this method is:
•  In the last 60 seconds, if a specific user caused the web server return only 1 error, 
this error is trivial and should be ignored as careless user operation. E.g., the user 
maybe types a wrong URI in the address bar of the web browser. This should not be 
counted as scan attack.
•  If in last 60 seconds, a same user caused the web server returned 50 errors. Then 
this user is quite suspicious and should be reported as intruder. Because he may use 
a hack tool to scan the web server or do dictionary attack.
•  This method is very efficient to detect probe attacks generated by hack tools that 
try to scan the web server for well-known vulnerable software.
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The idea is to accumulate damage caused by a same user in the past few seconds. If 
the total damage exceeds a maximum allowed value, this user will be reported as
intruder. The procedure is:
•  Set up a history queue storing up to N seconds of HTTP
•  When a new HTTP request comes, look back N seconds in the history queue
•  If a record in the history queue has the same client IP address (i.e. from the same 
user), and cause web server return an error code, then add the anomaly score for 
that error code to the current request
•  If the total anomaly score exceed a max value, mark this new request as anomaly
•  Store the new request into the queue and delete the oldest request from the queue if 
it is expired (older than N seconds to the new request) to keep the queue in 
reasonable size
We formulize it into algorithm 6 as shown in figure 20:
Algorithm 6: relation_check(new_request)
Input: new_request -  the current HTTP request examined by the sysem, including the 
client IP, web server return code, and receiving time 
Output: an accumulated anomaly score for this request 
Begin
(1) define historyjqueue;
(2) for each record r in history jqueue
(3) iff receiveJime in new_request - receiveJime in r < N  )
Begin
(4) If ret_code in r is an error code
(5) accumulated_score + = anomaly score for that error code;
End
else
(6) break;
/*save this record for future relation check*/
(7) push this record into history queue;
/*to keep the queue in reasonable size*/
(8) iff receiveJime in new_request - receivejim e in tail record o f the queue > N )
(9) delete tail record from the queue;
(10)retum accumulated_score;
End________________________________________________________________
Figure 20 Algorithm 6 -  relation_check
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3.1.3. Misuse detection with signatures
Misuse detection uses patterns of well-known attacks or weak spots of the system 
to identify intrusion. Unlike anomaly detection, misuse detection does not need training. 
But it relies on experience of human being who designs the misuse detection model.
In out SensorWeblDS, instead of finding pattern for each known web attack, we choose 
to abstract the common nature of existing web attacks into several high level signatures, 
and use them to match input data. These common signatures can be categorized into 
two classes: one type of signatures are summarized based on web server return codes, 
the others are deduced based on forbidden keyword that could be used in web 
intrusions.
3.1.3.1. Signatures based on web server return code
When the web server receives a HTTP request, it will always make a response to 
that request, by sending out a HTTP response back to the client and record the 
request/response into log file. The HTTP specification defines a set of HTTP return 
codes for web server. For normal requests, the web server returns correct codes, while 
for bad requests it returns error codes. When the web server generating an error code, 
there is always something not good happened. It could be caused by a malicious user 
request, or by a normal user accessing some defective web pages. Continuous bad 
requests sent from the same user are especially suspicious. So by tracking the web 
server return codes, we can find out the hack activities when the hacker is doing 
experiments on the victim system in order to find the security hole. We summarized 
four common rules that are especially useful to detect some web attacks mentioned 
before. They are used in this way: if a user violates any one of the rules, predefined 
anomaly score for that rule will be added to the anomaly score of that user.
1) A Client cannot access too many non-existing URIs in a short time
This signature is based on the fact that a normal user will not access too many
non-existing URL paths in a short time But a hacker could use scanning tool to send out
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lots of GET request in a short time to do a dictionary search for vulnerable CGIs. In the 
scan process, many requested URIs do not exist on the web server. So the web server 
will generate lots of ‘URI not exists error’, whose return code is 404. The anomaly 
score for this signature is 1.
2) A Client cannot produce too many unauthorized error in a short time
For those web pages that need WWW-authentication, normal users will send out their 
username/password in a low frequency. If a client is sending out the username/ 
password at a fast speed, he could be using some kind of dictionary scanning tool to 
guess the username/password. The web server’s error return code for authentication 
failure is 401. The anomaly score for this signature is 2.
3) A Client cannot produce too many Forbidden errors in a short time
If a web user tries to access some confidential files or executing some privileged CGIs, 
the web server will return 403 -  forbidden message. A malicious user who wants to 
view/execute important files could generate some of these messages. The anomaly 
score for this signature is 2.
4) Request that cause internal errors are suspicious
At most time, if a HTTP request caused the web server return “500” error, this request is 
very suspicious. Since “500” error means “the server encountered an unexpected 
condition which prevented it from fulfilling the request” [FIG+99]. The anomaly score 
for this signature is 5.
3.1.3.2. Signatures based on forbidden keywords
Almost all Cross Site Reference (XSS) attacks and SQL-Injection attacks are using 
one technology: inject boundary characters or keywords into user input data to fool the 
script engine or SQL compilers on the server side. And make them find the wrong 
boundary for that parameter and continuously executing the rest of the code injected by 
attackers. So by monitoring sensitive keywords in user supplied data, i.e. parameter 
values, such kind of script attacks can be identified easily. For XSS attack, the most 
dangerous keywords are </script>, <script>, and <img>. The first two keywords are
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boundary keywords. The third one is also dangerous because it will allow user to 
download potentially dangerous data from foreign sites. Other general HTML tags are 
less dangerous but should also be paid attention to. HTML tags are in the format of 
<Tag>. For easy purpose, the audit engine detects the HTML tags by searching for < 
and > in the parameter values of a HTTP record. For each pair of < and > found in the 
value, the anomaly score for that record will be added by 10.
The forbidden keywords for SQL-injection attack are single quote (‘) and double 
quote (“). For each of these two keywords found by the audit engine, 10 will add the 
anomaly score for that record because this evidence is a very strong signal for intrusion. 
These forbidden keywords form the array FBJist used in algorithm 2, figure 13 above.
3.2. Do both real-time monitor and off-line analyze
Most existing web intrusion detection systems are using input data from off-line 
log files. The good thing is that these log files are well organized and easy to parse. The 
bad things are: 1) the log files miss some important information in the user input data. 
E.g., user data transferred through HTTP POST method is not recorded in the log file. 
So if the intrusions were hidden in that portion of data, the IDS will not find any 
evidence in the log file at all. And these intrusions will not be found. (One reason not to 
log this information is for performance consideration, another reason is for security 
concern) 2) Response time is too long -  the intrusions discovered in the log files 
happened at a relatively long time ago. The administrator has lost the most valuable 
time to limit the damage caused by the intrusion.
To combat these limitations, our SensorWeblDS uses network sensor to capture 
real-time network traffic between clients and the web server, and extract HTTP request 
and response from the traffic. Then it sends the information to audit engine for further 
processing. Because the network sensor sits on the network side and does not depend on 
the web server’s log, it has the whole picture of all user input data. It can monitor all 
user input data embedded in URI, cookie and HTTP user data sections (see 3.3 for more 
information). Another important benefit is that once an anomaly is found by the audit
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engine, it can be guaranteed that the attack happened a short time ago. Then the 
administrator will have enough time to investigate this incident and do something right. 
This greatly increases the usability of the EDS and makes it deployable in real world 
environment. However, there are two main shortages for this method. First one is that 
the HTTP request sent from the user to the web server and the response containing the 
web server’s return code are separated in two network packet captured at different time 
by the network sensor. These two packets are treated as two records to the audit engine, 
which will affect the efficiency of the audit engine for a little bit. The second shortage is 
that it is nearly impossible to read the encrypted HTTP content. E.g., if the web server 
and the user are communicating in HTTPS format, the network sensor will only capture 
some useless data that cannot be restored to the original content. So the network sensor 
dose not support encrypted HTTP traffic.
On the other hand, like traditional IDS, SensorWeblDS has another program called 
log digger that collects input data from web server’s log files. This program extracts 
useful information from the log file and sends it to the audit engine, for training purpose 
(when audit engine is in running learning stage) or for detecting intrusion (when audit 
engine is running in detecting stage).
Both network sensor and log digger programs are not necessarily to be running on 
the same machine as the one that the audit engine is running. This flexible design that 
separates the input from the audit engine makes it easy to monitor more than one web 
server at the same time. Figure 21 shows an example of how to monitor two web 
servers using two network sensors and two log diggers with one central audit engine:
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Web Serverl Log digger programNetwork Sensor 1
internet
Network Sensor 2
Log diggdr progra
Web Server2
Central Analysis 
Engine
Report
Figure 21 Monitor two web servers using one central IDS
3.3. Network sensor
From the analysis in 3.2, some existing web intrusion detection systems have two 
major problems: they can only see partial user input data in HTTP request because they 
use web log files only; and they do off-line monitoring that significantly delays the time 
to process the incident. To combat these two problems, we proposed to use network 
sensor in our system. This network sensor is a program developed by us to capture all 
the HTTP packets to/from the web server. It enables us to:
•  Monitor all user supplied data in HTTP packet including data in URI, cookie and 
user data sections.
•  Do real-time monitoring and detection, instead of doing post-intrusion detection 
with log files.
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By using network sensor, our SensorWeblDS has all the information on user input 
data in HTTP request. The information includes:
1) Parameters embedded in GET URI
For example: a HTTP GET request contains this line “GET
/login.asp?usemame=abc&password=123 HTTP/l.l\r\n”. The parameters here are 
“username” and “password”, values are “abc” and “123”
2) Parameters in content fields through POST request
POST method means “do not show parameters in URI as GET method does, put the 
parameters in HTTP content instead”. Inside HTTP header, there is a field 
“Content-Length” which indicates how long the content is appended at the tail of this 
HTTP request. A POST request with parameters will set this field to the length of the 
parameters and values. For example here is a HTTP POST request:
“POST /current/result.jsp HTTP/1. l\r\n 
Content-Length: 25\r\n length of parameter list 
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0\r\n
\r\n <r parameter list begins with a blank line with \r\n
usemame=abc&password=123” parameter list
3) Cookie data
Cookie is a small piece of data coming from web server and should be stored at client 
side. The contents in the cookie are arbitrary, but normally are some status identifiers, 
e.g., user id to distinguish different users. Once the client stores the cookie, each time it 
accesses the same web page, this cookie data will be included in the HTTP request 
initialized from the client to the server. For example, a cookie from the server is already 
stored by the client, then the client issues a HTTP POST request like this:
“POST /pl/Aconline/en/OverrideServlet HTTP/1. l\r\n 
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0\r\n 
Cookie: usrid=l\r\n parameter list 
Vr\n”
To capture all the packets on the network, the SensorWeblDS uses WinPcap -  a 
free link-layer network access library ([RD01]). Using this library, the network sensor
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can set the network card into promiscuous mode, which allows the network card to 
receive all network packets regardless of the destination of the packets. In 
non-promiscuous mode, the network card can only capture the packets that are destined 
to it.
After the network sensor captured the HTTP request packet, it extracts useful 
information out of the request and send it to the audit engine for furthur anomaly 
evaluation. The information includes: URI, user IP, time of receiving, web server return 
code, parameter list.
The algorithm used in network sensor is shown in figure 22:
Algorithm 8: sensor_capture_Main()
Input: network packet
Output: formatted HTTP request including URI, user IP, time of receiving, web server
return code, parameter list
Begin
(1) While(TRUE)
Begin
(2) Receive a network packet pfrom network card;
(3) If( p  is NOT HTTP packet)
(4) Continue loop;
(5) Extract URI, user IP, time of receiving, web server return code, parameter list 
out o f HTTP packet, and format them in a desired style;
(6) Send the formatted information to the center audit engine for evaluation;
End
End
Figure 22 Algorithm 8 -  sensor_capture_Main
3.4. Log digger
Log digger is a part of our SensorWeblDS system. It is used to gather HTTP 
request from web server’s log file. An example record in the log file looks like: 
127.0.0.1 -frank [10/0ct/2000:13:55:36 -0700] "GET /exampleCGl.php ?id=20 
HTTP/1.0" 200 2326
(1) 127.0.0.1
- 6 6 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
SensorWeblDS: A Sensor with Misuse and Anomaly Based Data Mining Technique for Web Intrusion Detection
This is the IP address of the client (remote host) which made the request to the server.
(2) -
The "hyphen" in the output indicates that the requested piece of information is not 
available. In this case, the information that is not available is the RFC 1413 identity of 
the client determined by identid on the client's machine. This information is highly 
unreliable and should almost never be used except on tightly controlled internal 
networks.
(3) frank
This is the userid of the person requesting the document as determined by HTTP 
authentication.
(4) [10/0ct/2000:13:55:36 -0700]
The time that the request was received.
(5) "GET /exampleCGI.php?id=20 HTTP/1.0"
This is the request line from the client. There are two requests that can allow user 
upload input parameters: GET and POST. For GET requests, the parameters are 
embedded in the request strings. While in POST requests, only URLs are recorded. 
Parameters inside POST requests are carried in body section of HTTP protocol. For 
some reasons (security and performance), they are not recorded by most web servers.
(6)200
This is the status code that the server sends back to the client. This information is very 
valuable, because it reveals whether the request resulted in a successful response (codes 
beginning in 2), a redirection (codes beginning in 3), an error caused by the client 
(codes beginning in 4), or an error in the server (codes beginning in 5).
(7)2326
The last entry indicates the size of the object returned to the client, not including the 
response headers. If no content was returned to the client, this value will be 
The log digger parses each record in the log file, and extracts useful information (URI, 
user IP, time of receiving, web server return code, and parameter list) out from it. Then 
it sends the information to audit engine for training (when the audit engine is running in 
learning stage) or detecting (when the audit engine is running in detecting stage).
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The algorithm used in log digger is shown in figure 23.
Algorithm 7: Log_digger_Main(log_file_name)
Input: log_file_name -  web server’s log file name
Output: formatted HTTP request including URI, user IP, time of receiving, web server return
code, parameter list
Begin
(1) Open file logJile_name;
(2) While( file not reaching the end )
Begin
(3) Extract URI, user IP, time of receiving, web server return code, parameter list out of 
HTTP packet, and format them in a desired style;
(4) Send the formatted information to the center audit engine for processing;
End
End
Figure 23 Algorithm 7 -  Log_digger_Main
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4. Experiment and evaluation
We developed a prototype system, SensorWeblDS, that implements the algorithms 
and technologies described in chapter 3. The system is consisting of three programs: 
audit engine (see chapter 3.1), network sensor (see chapter 3.3), and log digger (see 
chapter 3.4). The network sensor is used to capture HTTP requests at real-time from 
network traffic and sends them to audit engine for intrusion analysis. The log digger is 
used to extract HTTP requests from web server’s log files and sends them to audit 
engine for intrusion analysis. The audit engine is the brain and decision-maker of 
SensorWeblDS system.
The goal of this experiment is to prove that our SensorWeblDS system can detect 
more kinds of web intrusions than other systems, at the same or lower cost. We compare 
the SensorWeblDS with two other systems -  SNORT [Roe99] and mod_Security 
[103-1], both of which are claimed to be able to detect web intrusions.
4.1. Implementation and testing environment
Our prototype system is developed with C language under windows platform. 
However, with little changes, it can be easily migrated to UNIX platform. These 
changes include replacing system dependent APIs (e.g., process manipulation APIs); 
creating makefiles for the system; and compiling the whole system again under UNIX 
with C compiler.
We select two other intrusion detection systems to compare with our 
SensorWeblDS. One is SNORT([Roe99]) and the other is mod_Security([I03-l]). The 
experiment is divided into three parts. In the first part, we test our SensorWeblDS along 
with two other systems by using crafted web intrusions, to see how many intrusions 
each system can find. In the second part, the efficiency of three systems are tested by 
using continuous crafted web intrusions and compare the CPU usage on the computer 
that is hosting the IDS system. In the third part, the SensorWeblDS is tested by using
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log files coming from real web servers, and see how it performs in real world.
The testing environment consists of 4 computers: SI is running the web server 
(Apache 2.2 + Tomcat 5.5) and mod_Security [I03-l](this system must be installed as a 
component to the web server). S2 is running SensorWeblDS (audit engine only) and 
SNORT [Roe99]. S3 is running network sensor and log digger parts for SensorWeblDS. 
Cl is the terminal, which is running windows XP SP2 with Internet Explorer 6.0 (both 
are trademarks of Microsoft Corporation), to simulate user input. They are all 
connected to a shared HUB device, which ensures the traffic to the web server can be 
fully seen by our system. The hardware configurations for all the machines are the same 
-  CPU AMD 2400+, 512M RAM. The topology of the network is shown in figure 24:
C 1 : client m achineS 1 : W eb  S erver 
M ocLSecurity
S2: S ensorW eblD S 
(Audit Engine), 
SNORT
S3: S ensorW eblD S 
(network sen so r, log digger)
y
HUB
Figure 24 Experiment hardware environment 
On the web server SI, we installed a simple web application named “login.jsp”. 
This application accepts ‘username’ (maximum 8 characters) and ‘password’ 
(maximum 8 characters) parameters from the user input. The legal ‘username’ and 
‘password’ are shown in table 9:
Username Password
‘Mary’ ‘111’
‘Joe’ ‘12345’
‘Jeffery’ ‘12345678’
Table 9 Crafted intrusions for experiment
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It returns HTTP code 200 (OK) to the requests having correct username/password, and 
returns code 400 (bad request) and displays the wrong username/password to the client. 
The application also sets a cookie -  ‘SESSIONID’ with length of 16 to the client’s web 
browser.
To train the SensorWeblDS, we used the web browser in Cl to access the 
“login,jsp” page on SI, and repeatedly inputted legal username/password on that page 
for 9 times (each username/password for 3 times). Then we took out the web server’s 
log file from SI, and sent it to the log digger that is running on S3. The log digger 
formatted the HTTP requests and sent them to audit engine running on S2 for training. 
After that, the audit engine learned and stored the frequent parameter presence & order 
as [“login.jsp” “username”, “password”], and the possible maximum lengths for 
“username” as 9.83 and “password” as 8.89. SNORT [Roe99] is not using anomaly 
detection, so it does not need training. To make SNORT detect as many kinds of 
intrusion as it can, we included and used all the newest detecting rules. We also enabled 
the “http_inspect” preprocessor in the configuration to make it inspect the payload of 
the HTTP connection. Just like SNORT, mod_Security [103-1] does not need training 
either. We turned on all the filters in the system to use the full power of it.
4.2. Detection rate test with well-known web attacks
In this experiment, we used crafted well-known web intrusions to test how many 
intrusions can be found by each system. We crafted 6 groups of different web intrusions. 
Each group consists of 10 test cases that belonged to the same type of web intrusion. 
There are totally 60 test intrusions. These 6 groups of web intrusions are listed in table 
10 below.
Group # Attack Example Input Description
1 Cross Site 
Scripting
Use URL 
“http://Sl/login.jsp?usemame=<script>al 
ert(l)</script>&password=123” in the 
C l’s web browser
XSS embedded HTML 
tags in user’s input. Our 
system captured the 
keyword <script> as the 
proof of the attack.
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2 SQL
Injection
In the ‘login.jsp’ web page, type 
usemame=Joe, and passwords’ or “1”=1
SQL-Injection attack use 
“ or ‘ to fool SQL server. 
Our system captured the 
keyword “ as the proof of 
the attack.
3 Denial of 
Service
Use packet generating tool to send request 
with wrong usemame&password at the 
rate of 200 times per second
The tool caused the web 
server return error code 
400 at a speed of 200 
times/sec
4 Buffer over 
flow
In the ‘login.jsp’ page, use ‘username’ 
from length 1 to 10
The maximal allowed 
value for ‘username’ is 8
5 Cookie
poison
In C l change the stored cookie 
‘SESSIONID’ to the value of 32 ‘b’s
The maximal allowed 
value for cookie 
‘SESSIONID’ is 16
6 Simulation 
of using 
hack tool
Use URL 
“http://Sl/login.jsp?password=l 1 l&usem 
ame=Mary” in the C l’s web browser
Hack tools do not use the 
same parameter order and 
presence as that of official 
web page. The correct 
parameter order and 
presence [username, 
password]
Table 10 Crafted intrusions for experiment
We then used these 6 groups of test cases on three systems, and wrote down the 
number of intrusions reported by each system. We measured the accuracy of the 
detection by using Detection_Rate defined as:
_ Number o f Intrusions foundDetection _ Rate = ----------- ~------------- —-------
Total _ number _ o f  _  Intrusions
The result is shown in table 11 and figure 25 below:
- 7 2 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
SensorWeblDS: A Sensor with Misuse and Anomaly Based Data Mining Technique for Web Intrusion Detection
IDS Total intrusions Detected Intrusions not 
detected
Detection_Rate
SensorWeblDS 60 59 In group 4, 
when the 
‘username’ 
took length of 
9
98.3%
SNORT 60 30 All intrusions 
in group 3,4 5, 
and 6
33.3%
Mod_Security 60 30 All intrusions 
in group 3,4 5, 
and 6
33.3%
Table 11 Result of testing detection rate with well-known attacks
Detection Rate test  using craft intrusions
SensorWeblDS SNORT mod_Security
Figure 25 Detection rate test using craft intrusions
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4.3. Detection speed test
In this test, we compare three systems by using their detection speed. Because all 
these three systems are essentially doing real-time detection by using rules matching, 
they return intrusion alarm immediately upon receiving malicious input. It is not easy to 
measure how much time each system will spend on detecting one intrusion. Instead, we 
use a more easy and accurate method to test the detection speed, i.e. we measure the 
CPU usage of the machine that is running the IDS when it is detecting continuous 
intrusions. However, mod_Security is running on the same machine as the Web server 
(SI on figure 24), which two systems share the same resource. To get a fair result on 
three systems, we moved two other systems (SNORT and our SensorWeblDS) from S2 
to SI on figure 24 (we still kept the network sensor and log digger running on S3).
For the input data, we wrote a small test program that sent 6 intrusions (one for 
each group in table 10 above) using HTTP protocol repeatedly. We used three speeds to 
send the intrusions: 10 times/second, 100 times/second, and 1000 times/second. And 
each test lasted for 60 seconds and we calculate the average CPU usage during that time. 
Obviously, lower the CPU usage is better. Since the system can detect more intrusions 
using the rest of the resource. The test result is shown in table 12 and figure 26 below:
Average CPU usage during 60 seconds
Sending speed SensorWeblDS SNORT Mod_Security
10/second 13% 13% 12%
100/second 25% 28% 22%
1000/second 80% 85% 76%
Table 12 Result of testing detection rate with well-known attacks
- 7 4 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
SensorWeblDS: A Sensor with Misuse and Anomaly Based Data Mining Technique for Web Intrusion Detection
CPU usage when d e te c t in g  in tr u s io n s
■  SensorWeblDS
■  SNORT
□ mod S ecu rity
In tru s io n  Sending Speed
Figure 26 Measure CPU usage to scale detecting speed (smaller is better)
4.4.Test system with log files from real web servers
In this experiment, we tested our SensorWeblDS using three log files coming from 
three different web servers. These log files are show in table 13:
Log file Records count Source
Logl 25184 From a small radio station web site
Log2 49755 From a small-size company web site
Log3 878521 From UofW computer science web site
Table 13 Test log files from three web servers
We only tested these data sets on our SensorWeblDS system because the two other 
systems do not have the ability to analyze web log. The purpose of this test is to show 
that the SensorWeblDS is really useful in real world environment.
We divided each log file into two parts, and used the first part (20%) as the training 
data and the second part (80%) as the input data to be audited. For the training data, we 
use human eyes to do inspection to eliminate intrusions in it, since the system needs a
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pure training data without any intrusion to learn the correct rules. After the detection is 
finished, we analyzed the reported intrusion with human eyes and checked if they are 
real intrusions. For log file 3, SensorWeblDS found no intrusion at all. The reason will 
be explained in chapter 4.5. After the test running, we audited the log file (80% part) by 
human eyes to see if there is any intrusion that is not found by our system. Because the 
log files are too large to be inspected one by one, we used sampling method. That is we 
randomly sampled 1% of the data from log file for three times and examined if there 
was any intrusion in. The experiment result is shown in the table 14 below:
Log file Records count Intrusions
reported
Intrusions
missed
Notes
Logl 25174 2 0 2 probes attacks
Log2 49755 16 0 5 DoS attacks, 4 
probe attacks, 3 
buffer-over-flow 
attacks, 4 false 
alarms
Log3 878521 5 0 All 5 intrusions 
are false alarms
Table 14 Test result on three log files
4.5. Result analysis
In the experiment 1, we can see that our SensorWeblDS has the highest detection 
rate in three systems. It can detect more types of intrusions than the two other systems. 
The only intrusion that SensorWeblDS missed is the test case that used a 9-character 
length “username” as input. In the training period, the system calculate the possible 
maximum value length for the “username” is 9.83 (by using 3-standard-deviation), 
while the real maximum value length for that parameter is 8. To reduce the difference 
between predicted value and real value, we can use more training data to make the 
predicted value better. The two other systems -  SNORT and mod_Security performed 
well for test case groups 1 and 2 but bad for test case groups 3,4, 5 and 6. Because:
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• Intrusions in groups 1 and 2 can be easily detected by matching malicious keywords 
in the parameter values, which is what these two IDSs did.
• However, for intrusions in groups 3, 4, 5 and 6, they are not easy to be found 
without analyzing historical data. For intrusions in group 3, it even needs to analyze 
the relationship among sequential HTTP requests in a period of time, which is one 
feature that our SensorWeblDS has. But the two other systems merely pay attention 
to the current HTTP request and ignore its relationship with previous ones.
The experiment 2 tested detection speed for three systems. It shows that the 
detection speed for our SensorWeblDS is faster than SNORT but slower than 
mod_Security. The reasons are:
• The SensorWeblDS uses a distributed system architecture, which separates the 
input (network sensor and log digger) from the main unit (audit engine). This shifts 
some work off the main unit and increases the total efficiency of the system. The 
network sensor, log digger and audit engine can be run at different machines.
• The SNORT is a general network intrusion detection system that has hundreds of 
rules and well-known intrusion signatures needed to be evaluated for each network 
packet, while our SensorWeblDS is only focusing on Web intrusion detection and 
has much less rules to test and has a high efficient audit engine.
• Mod_Security is a little bit faster than SensorWeblDS, because it is running as a 
module/process in the web server and share the same information with the web 
server. It does not need to capture and parse any network packet. The Web server 
does all these works. However, SensorWeblDS and SNORT have full functional 
network sensors and need to parse each packet from link layer to HTTP protocol 
layer. For example, mod_Security can easily get the source IP address of the HTTP 
request from the web server while SensorWeblDS and SNORT have to decode the 
full network packet and get it from the IP protocol header. But the disadvantage of 
being embedded into Web server is obvious (as described in 2.2.3): it sacrifices the 
flexibility and scalability and has to develop different version for different Web 
server.
In the experiment 3, we used log files from real web servers to see if SensorWeblDS
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can detect web intrusions in real-world environment. For the log file 1, there are only 
two probe attacks found by the system, since the web site generating this log file is not 
a popular one and has fixed group of visitors. These two attacks are launched by 
hackers using tools to scan the web server. The log file 2 comes from a web server 
running in a small size company and contains more intrusions. The four false alarms are 
generated because of the maximum parameter length rule: a few legal clients were 
using longer parameter values than that of most other clients did. The reason that 
SensorWeblDS could not find any real intrusion is that log file 3 comes from an internal 
web server that is used only by the students in the computer science department. It is 
isolated from outside users. All 5 intrusions reported are false alarms caused by 
maximum parameter length rule.
As the conclusion, the advantages of SensorWeblDS are that it can detect more 
kinds of web intrusions than two other well-known intrusion detection systems. By 
separating the input from the audit engine and using signature matching, the detection 
speed for SensorWeblDS is faster than SNORT [Roe99] and close to mod_Security 
[103-1], which is built into the web server but lost the flexibility and scalability. Thus, 
the SensorWeblDS has improved the accuracy and efficiency for detecting Web 
intrusions with high flexibility and scalability.
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5. Conclusion and future work
In this thesis work, we developed a novel web intrusion detection system, 
SensorWeblDS, which combines the power of anomaly detection and misuse detection. 
We use association rules mining to find frequent parameter presences and orders, and a 
new algorithm using standard deviation to calculate the maximum value length in 
three-dimensional input to combat buffer-over-flow attack. Based on our research on 
well-known web intrusions, we abstract some common signatures and sensitive 
keywords signatures to match known attacks. Our system develops a software sensor to 
monitor real-time traffic to improve intrusion response time. Being different from 
existing web intrusion systems, which get HTTP requests only from web log files that 
contain part of user inputs, our system collects data from both real-time network data 
and web log files to ensure all user supplied data is under monitoring. In HTTP request 
processing, existing web intrusion detection systems audit each record separately, while 
our system consider the relationships amongst records in a time window. This is based 
on the fact that it is always suspicious if the same user behind the requests causes lots of 
error in a short of time.
The experiments show that SensorWeblDS has higher detection rate than SNORT 
[Roe99] and mod_Security [103-1] at a faster or similar detection speed. It has 
improved the accuracy and efficiency for detecting Web intrusions with high flexibility 
and scalability.
The SensorWeblDS can be improved to detect more new intrusions in the future by 
adopting more sophisticated anomaly detection methods. Here are some ideas:
1) Track user’s resource accessing sequence. The same web page, which make user 
submit input data, always contains some other elemental resources like background 
picture, logo picture, CSS, “.js” javascript file, etc. If the user is browsing through 
this web page, s/he must always access these resources before he can send out input 
data to the web server [FIG+99]. Based on HTTP standards [FIG+99], what
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happened when a user access a web page on his web browser is like this: the user 
will firstly initial separate HTTP GET requests for each of those elemental 
resources in that page. After that, the user can see the whole page (sometimes some 
resources will not be displayed due to slow network speed, but the HTTP requests 
for these resources have been sent out already), and he can input some data on the 
page and click submit button. But a malicious attacker will not obey this rule. He 
will use hack tools to send out HTTP “GET”/”POST” requests directly without 
requesting for other elemental resources before that. Due to this nature, the IDS can 
learn the names for those elemental resources that legal users must access before 
they can submit user inputs based, and use this information to find anomalies in 
current HTTP session. If a user has not visited those resources in the name set 
before submitting the inputs, he could be suspicious of using some kind of hack 
tools to attack the web server.
2) Track users with their web page access sequence. In most cases, web users will 
reach their destination pages through a fixed or similar sequence of web pages. 
However, a hacker may get there by using some secret back doors, or by stealing 
login information from legal users. So the access consequence of a hacker will be 
different from that of a normal user. There are two ways to track accessing 
consequences. A simple one is to track how many layers or how many intermediate 
web pages accessed by a normal user before s/he reach a destination page. Another 
more complex way is to store the addresses of intermediate web pages, and use 
those addresses comparison to detect attack.
3) Integer parameter values should have logical Max/Min range
For example, the HTTP GET request
http://victim/shopcart.cgi?cat=Electronic&product=TV 123&price=2500 stands for 
a linkage in a shopping web site. The parameter “price” is integer type which should 
be fall into a logical range (e.g., 1000-9000), too large value or too small value is 
invalid input that should be seen as a malicious activity to compromise the remote 
web application. For example, an attacker tries to use the following link to buy a TV 
with one dollar:
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http://victim/shopcart.cgi?cat=Electronic&product=TV123&price=l.
4) Learning with training data that contain intrusions. Currently, for the training data 
we used to learn the frequent parameter presence and order, we suppose the training 
data is intrusion free or use human eyes to eliminate the intrusions. Otherwise the 
patterns learned from the training data are accurate. However, it’s not easy to 
inspect large training data set manually. A possible solution is to use cluster method 
([BBG99], [ZS04]) in data mining to keep most normal data in the data set 
automatically. Since intrusions are quite rare and are different from normal requests, 
it’s possible to group the normal requests in big clusters and attacks in small clusters. 
Then we only pick up the big clusters as training data.
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